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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final judgment, in a civil 
contract and tort action, entered by Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, and from 
two prior non-final partial summary judgments also entered by 
Judge Hyde. The final judgment originally appealed from 
[Second Revised Judgment, R. 1351] and an Order denying a 
motion for new trial [R. 1324] were both entered on March 16, 
1988, and Notice of Appeal was filed on April 8, 1988 
(R. 1361). The appeal initially was taken to the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as 
amended). The appeal was then transferred to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended). 
During the pendency of the appeal, jurisdictional 
questions arose because of confusion created by the District 
Court's bifurcation of certain claims prior to trial. If the 
District Court intended to sever those claims pursuant to Rule 
21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then the March 16 judgment 
was the final order in the case even absent certification 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If, on 
the other hand, the District Court intended to order only 
separate trials under Rule 42(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, then the March 16 judgment was not a final order 
because it did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification. See, 
U.S. v. O'Neill, 709 F.2d 361, 366-369 (5th Cir. 1983). The 
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Combes anticipate that this jurisdictional issue will be 
resolved by a temporary remand, during which the March 16 judg-
ment will be amended to include a Rule 54(b) certification, and 
an amended notice of appeal will be filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court improperly granted the 
plaintiff-buyers (Breuer, Harrison and their corporation, 
referred to collectively as the "Developers") summary judgment 
rescinding the Real Estate Contract with defendants Keith and 
Evelyn Combe ("the Combes") due to disputed issues of material 
fact concerning: 
(a) whether the Developers knew about the pipe-
line affecting the subject property before entering into the 
contract, but still chose to go forward with the purchase, and 
therefore waived the alleged breach; 
(b) whether the Developers' recission claims are 
barred by waiver, laches or estoppel because, even though they 
knew of the pipeline, they waited for five years to seek 
rescission, during which time they specifically and repeatedly 
reaffirmed the contract; and 
(c) the interpretation of conflicting and 
ambiguous provisions of the contract concerning the scope of 
title warranties. 
2. Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that 
there were no material facts in dispute and that, as a matter 
-2-
of law, the Combes did not have a malpractice cross-claim 
against their attorney, co-defendant Robert E. Froerer. 
3. Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded 
that, as a matter of law, the Combes had no cross-claims 
against Froerer [or his principal, co-defendant Attorneys Title 
Guarantee Fund, Inc. (ATGF)] for abstractor's negligence. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in summarily con-
cluding that the Combes had no claim against ATGF under the 
policy of title insurance, even though the terms of the policy 
were ambiguous as to the scope of coverage. 
5. Whether the bifurcation of the Developers' claims 
against Froerer and ATGF, on the day before trial was to begin, 
was prejudicial to the Combes. 
6. Whether, even if rescission was properly granted, 
the trial court made legal errors in determining amounts to be 
refunded to the Developers, by: 
(a) offsetting the fair rental value of the 
property based on agricultural use, rather than highest and 
best use; and 
(b) determining fair rental value without regard 
to fair market value. 
7. Whether the award of over $130,000 in prejudgment 
interest was inequitable and excessive as a matter of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff Developers commenced this action in 
October, 1984, to rescind a December, 1979 Real Estate Contract 
to purchase land from the defendant Combes. [R. 1] The 
Developers also asserted claims against co-defendants Froerer 
and ATGF, and the Combes asserted cross-claims against these 
co-defendants. [R. 563] A separate action by the Combes for 
foreclosure of the Real Estate Contract was consolidated. 
The grounds for recission alleged by the Developers 
were defects in title resulting from a pipeline crossing the 
subject Property. The Combes asserted that the Developers knew 
of the pipeline before executing the Real Estate Contract and 
had waived any right to recission, or were barred by estoppel 
and laches. The Combes also denied breaching any warranties of 
title in the Contract. 
The Combes further claimed that their attorney, 
co-defendant Robert Froerer, negligently represented them, by 
drafting documents which allegedly required the transfer of 
property through warranty deed, and then by failing to timely 
or accurately complete the title work he was also retained to 
do. The Combes also claimed that Froerer and the title 
insurer, ATGF, were liable for faulty title work, based on 
abstractor's negligence and breach of the title policy. 
The trial court granted the Developers' summary judg-
ment motion against the Combes, ruling that there had been 
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no waiver, estoppel or laches, and that the Combes breached 
warranties of title in the Contract. [R. 474] The trial court 
later granted summary judgment against the Combes dismissing 
all of their claims against Froerer and the title company. 
[R. 878] 
A trial was finally held, but was limited to determin-
ing the amount of restitution to be received by the Developers 
from the Combes. On the day before trial, the Court bifurcated 
the Developers' own claims against Froerer and ATGF, over the 
Combes' objection. [R. 996] The jury empanelled in an advi-
sory capacity was discharged, and the Court found against the 
Combes. The Combes (including Keith's brother Clair) were 
required to refund to the Developers $236,966.21, plus pay 
$133,192.64 in prejudgment interest. [R. 1353] These amounts 
significantly exceed the current value of the property, as 
returned to the Combes. The Court credited the Combes only 
with the fair rental value of the property as agricultural 
property, rather than according to its highest and best use. 
The Court also denied the Combes' motion for new trial, which, 
among other things, asked for a trial of the issues previusly 
disposed of by the two partial summary judgments, based on 
testimony and proffers at trial. [R. 1260, 1262, 1324] 
Copies of the important District Court rulings are 
included in the Addendum. 
-5-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Unless otherwise indicated, references to the record 
on appeal are designated as MR.M, and references to the trial 
transcript [R. 1405] are designated as MTr.M. 
A. Background 
1. The property ("Property") which is the subject of 
this lawsuit is an undeveloped parcel of approximately twenty 
acres located in South Ogden, Utah. It was originally part of 
a farm developed by defendant Keith Combe's grandfather. The 
properties immediately to the south and west of the Property 
had been developed as residential areas prior to the events at 
issue here. [Tr. 202-203, 70, 215] 
2. Keith Combe was raised on the farm, but left 
shortly after the Second World War, when he turned sixteen. 
Although Keith remained in the Ogden area he never again lived 
on the farm and returned only to visit his parents. After 
working for a short period of time on the railroad, Keith pur-
chased a small fast-food operation, a business which he con-
tinues to own at the present time. The Combes have limited 
experience with the sale and purchase of real property. [Tr., 
pp. 195-203] 
3. Sometime in the early 1960's the Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District began constructing a water pipeline 
through the area. This pipeline crosses the Property. All 
negotiations with the Conservancy District were handled solely 
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by Keith's father and mother. At the time of the sale to the 
Developers, the Combe children did not know that the pipeline 
had been constructed on the Property. [Tr., pp. 213-216] 
4. Sometime in the 1970's Keith's mother decided to 
convey the Property to Keith and his three siblings, and the 
Property was divided into four parcels. Three of the parcels, 
including Keith's, were deeded directly to each child. The 
fourth parcel, designated to go to Keith's brother Clair, was 
held in a trust managed by First Security Bank (the "Bank") for 
Clair's benefit. [Tr., pp. 196-197; Affidavit of Keith Combe, 
R. 1257] 
5. The Developers are California residents who are 
in the real estate development business. By 1979 Breuer and 
Harrison each had about thirty (30) years of experience in real 
estate development, having been involved in numerous large 
scale residential and commercial projects in Southern 
California. They had extensive experience with the sale and 
purchase of real property, and the purpose and use of title 
reports and title insurance. [Tr., pp. 60, 72-73] 
B. The Sale of the Property to the Developers. 
6. Sometime during 1979, the Developers became 
interested in purchasing property in Utah for development. 
They had some familiarity with Utah, having visited the Wasatch 
Front area on a number of occasions. Accordingly, they 
contacted Steve Keil, an Ogden real estate agent, whose 
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father-in-law was a superintendent on one of their California 
projects. Keil worked at a real estate firm owned by Bruce 
Nielson. Keil, Nielson, and another agent, Duane Brian, later 
became partners with the Developers in developing the 
Property. [Tr., pp. 61-62, 129-132, 221, 233-234] 
7. During that summer of 1979, the Developers were 
shown a number of large parcels in and around Ogden. One of 
the parcels which they examined was the Property owned by Keith 
Combe and his siblings. The Developers physically inspected 
the Property, reviewed plat maps, looked at demographic and 
economic data for the area, and reviewed other information from 
Keil. At no time prior to executing the Real Estate Contract 
did the Developers meet or even talk with the Combes or a 
representative of the Bank. Their first meeting with Keith 
Combe did not occur until five years later, during the late 
summer of 1984, when they first demanded rescission of the 
purchase agreement. [Tr., pp. 61-62, 83, 198, 221-224; Keil 
Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 6-9] 
8. Before deciding to purchase the Property, the 
Developers hired an engineering firm, Great Basin Engineering, 
to analyze the suitability of the Property as a residential 
subdivision. The owner of Great Basin Engineering was Jay 
Anderson, who had witnessed the construction of the pipeline, 
had designed several subdivisions in the area and knew that the 
existence of the pipeline would have to be accounted for in 
designing and constructing any subdivision. [Tr., pp. 224-233] 
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9. Prior to the date of purchase, Great Basin per-
formed a wide variety of engineering tasks and analysis for the 
Developers. Great Basin prepared preliminary subdivision plat 
maps showing possible layouts for a tract of single family 
homes, so that the Developers could determine whether or not 
the property could be subdivided profitably. Great Basin also 
did extensive soil testing, onsite ground water analysis, 
runoff flow analysis, and met with various government 
agencies. [Tr., pp. 224-233, 251-262] 
10. The actual design work was assigned to Charles 
Olsen, an engineer at Great Basin. Olsen first prepared what 
is referred to as a "base sheet". The base sheet showed the 
property boundaries, surrounding subdivisions and streets. It 
also showed the pipeline running across the property. Olsen 
then sketched out a number of different subdivision configura-
tions using semitransparent paper which was placed over the 
base sheet. After he had come up with a satisfactory layout, 
Olsen attached it to a copy of the base sheet. All of the sub-
division layouts sketched by Olsen showed the pipeline and its 
thirty foot wide easement. [Tr., pp. 249-264. A reduced copy 
of Olsen's subdivision layout dated September 18, 19 79 is 
included in the Addendum. The pipeline is labelled "aqueduct."] 
11. Olsen's preliminary sketches and layouts were 
shown to Keil on or about September 18, 1979, by Anderson. At 
this meeting Anderson specifically explained to Keil why it was 
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necessary to configure the subdivision around the pipeline. 
Five days later, the Developers went to Great Basin, met with 
either Anderson or Olsen, and received copies of the sub-
division layouts, all of which showed the pipeline. [Tr., pp. 
229-232, 235, 256, 264, 330-333; Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 
15, 22] 
12. After reviewing the subdivision layouts which 
showed that the Property could be subdivided into approximately 
57-60 building lots, Keil negotiated a purchase agreement with 
the Combes. [Tr., pp. 75, 232-233, 271-272] 
13. The Combes and the Bank were anxious to sell 
their parcels, but the remaining children were not. Accord-
ingly, the first task was to arrange a series of property 
trades between Keith and his brothers and sister so that the 
Combes and the Bank would end up with the entire property. 
Keith ended up owning approximately three-fourths of the 
property and the Bank owned the remaining parcel. An Ogden 
attorney, co-defendant Froerer, was retained and paid by the 
Combes and the Bank to prepare the necessary documents and 
complete these transactions. [Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 
6-8, 19-20, 48, 55-56; Deposition of Combe, R. 1411, pp. 25-29] 
14. Froerer was also retained and paid by the Combes 
to prepare the agreement selling the Property to the Devel-
opers. Froerer first drafted a preliminary agreement which was 
executed by the Developers on or about November 1, 1979. 
[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 6, 37] 
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15. Froerer then prepared a final agreement for the 
Combes entitled "Real Estate Contract", which set forth a total 
sales price of $410,880.00 and required a down payment of 
$75,000.00. Beginning on December 31, 1980, and continuing for 
the next three years, the Developers were to make annual 
interest-only payments. On December 31, 1983, the balance of 
the purchase price was due in full. The Real Estate Contract 
also stated that the property was specifically being purchased 
for the construction of a subdivision. [Froerer Deposition, R. 
1418, p. 38; A copy of the Real Estate Contract is part of the 
Addendum; Tr., pp.64] 
16. Paragraph 8 of the Real Estate Contract drafted 
by Froerer required the Combes and the Bank to warrant title to 
the Property, to furnish a title policy and to convey the 
Property by warranty deeds: 
8. Seller warrants that there are no liens 
or encumbrances on the property herein-above 
described and agrees to furnish to Buyer at 
Seller's expense the title policy showing 
good and marketable title in said property 
(said title policy to be furnished at the 
time of the receipt of down payment from 
Buyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute 
and deliver to Buyer, or assigns, good and 
sufficient warranty deeds covering title to 
the above-described property when subdivided 
and as paid for in accordance with the terms 
herein-above set out. 
[Froerer Deposition, R. 1418; Combe Deposition, R. 1411, 
pp. 25-29] 
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17. Paragraph 8 conflicted with two other paragraphs 
in the contract. Paragraph 4 required that an escrow account 
be set up, that the Combes convey title by warranty deed to an 
escrow agent to be named later, and that this agent convey 
title to the Developer by Special Warranty Deed as payments 
were made. This escrow was never created and an escrow agent 
was never named. Paragraph 5 disclaimed warranties: "The 
Seller hereby expressly disclaims any and all warranties and 
representations, express or implied, as to the state of the 
property, its condition, quality, character or suitability or 
fitness for any sue [sic], whether existing or contemplated, 
matters of zoning, or in other respect." (Emphasis added.) 
18. At no time did the Combes ever direct Froerer to 
include the warranty requirements set forth in paragraph 8. 
Froerer never explained these requirements to the Combes, and 
they did not understand what the requirements meant. [Froerer 
Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 26-27, 30, 54; Combe Deposition, R. 
1411, pp. 95-96] 
19. Froerer also agreed to conduct the title search 
on the Property for the title insurance policy required by 
paragraph 8. This work, and the policy, were also paid for by 
the Combes and the Bank. [Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 
8-12, 18-20, 62] 
20. Although Froerer did not finish the title search 
until after the closing, he did not inform the Combes of this 
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fact. At no time did Froerer warn the Combes, his clients, 
that they might not be able to warrant title. In reliance on 
Froerer, the Combes believed that they had complied with the 
terms of the contract and that title insurance had been 
obtained to protect them. [Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 
27, 30, 52-54; Combe Deposition, R. 1411, pp. 42-49] 
21. Even once it was completed, Froerer's title 
search did not reveal the pipeline and recorded easement 
running across the Property. [Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 
25-26; Complaint, R. 1] 
22. The title insurance policy was ultimately written 
by Froerer on behalf of co-defendant ATGF. At the time, 
Froerer was an agent of ATGF, owned stock in the company, and 
regularly researched titles and wrote title insurance for the 
company. [Froerer Deposition, R. 1418, pp. 10-11, 15-18, 45-46] 
23. The title policy appeared to protect the inter-
ests of the Combes as well as the Developers, because the 
policy specifically represented that the insured interest was 
vested in the Combes and the Bank. [A copy of the title policy 
is included in the Addendum; Combe Deposition, R. 1411, pp. 
42-44] 
24. Froerer also coordinated and handled all aspects 
of the December, 1979 closing. He obtained the execution of 
the Real Estate Contract by all parties, obtained the down 
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payment from the Developers, and forwarded funds to the Combes 
and the Bank. Froerer withdrew payment of his fees for draft-
ing the contracts, as well as his fees for the title search and 
the title policy, from the funds disbursed to the Combes and to 
the Bank. Since Froerer never set up the escrow account 
required by the contract, the Combes and the Bank never exe-
cuted the warranty deeds that would have transferred the 
Property to the unnamed escrow agent. [Froerer Deposition, R. 
1418, pp. 6-8, 18-20, 51, Exhibit 8] 
Cc Events Following the Sale of the Property. 
25. After the Real Estate Contract was signed, the 
Developers had Great Basin Engineering complete the subdivision 
layout by adding sewers and utilities to the plat which it had 
previously prepared. The final plat was completed by Great 
Basin Engineering in January of 1980. This final plat, like 
all of the previous plats, showed the pipeline running through 
the Property. [Tr., pp. 256-257] 
26. The Developers spent most of 1980 attempting to 
complete a sale of the Property to a third party, J.C.K. Land 
Development ("J.C.K.M). J.C.K. made an offer to purchase the 
Property even before the final Real Estate Contract with the 
Combes was signed. Several different Offers to Purchase and 
Earnest Money Agreements were drafted and the Developers 
received a $15,000.00 down payment from J.C.K. However, the 
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sale was never completed and the $15,000.00 deposit was for-
feited to the Developers.-' [Tr., pp. 149-152, 234-235, 
334-343] 
27. After the resale to J.C.K. failed to materialize, 
the Developers undertook to continue developing the property 
themselves. The next two years were primarily devoted to 
getting governmental approval for the subdivision. Most of the 
work was done by the local partners, Nielsen, Brian and Keil, 
who had used the real estate commission they had earned from 
the Combes' sale to purchase partnership interests. [Tr., 
pp. 71, 124-125, 92-93, 95, 86, 154] 
28. Until December of 1984, all yearly interest pay-
ments, of $35,000 each, were made. In the Fall of 1982, the 
Developers drafted an amendment to the contract which gave them 
an additional two years to pay the principal balance of the 
purchase price. This amendment was executed by the parties on 
or about November 24, 1982. This amendment was followed by a 
second one, dated January 3, 1983. The second amendment 
deferred, for six months, payment of one-half of the $35,000.00 
interest payment which had been due at the end of 1982. The 
-' This $15,000.00 was retained by the Developers 
and represents income received during their occupancy of the 
property. However, the trial court did not give the Combes and 
the Bank a credit for this amount. 
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Combes received no consideration for their execution of these 
amendments. [Tr., pp. 65, 109-111; 81-84, 204; These amend-
ments are included in the Addendum] 
29. The Developers admit that as of February 1983, 
they were fully informed about the existence of the pipeline 
and its easement. This information was contained in another 
title report given to the local partners by the Combes, who 
sought to borrow money to finance their restaurant and needed 
to use the Property and the Real Estate Contract as collat-
eral. During the next eighteen months, the Developers made no 
attempt to rescind the contract, or even to alert the Combes 
that they might seek rescission. [Tr., pp. 84, 157-161, 
178-179] 
30. Development efforts continued throughout 1983 and 
into 1984 and included hiring a new engineering firm to obtain 
Mfresh ideas" about developing the Property. One of the con-
cepts explored and platted out by this firm was the development 
of most of the Property as a condominium project. As with the 
original plans done by Great Basin Engineering, all of the 
plats, drawings and plans prepared by the new firm showed the 
pipeline. Further, the deferred interest payment for 1982 was 
made in June of 1983, and interest for 1983 was paid in 
December of that year. [Tr., pp. 84-86, 133-134, 174-175, 
185-186] 
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31. During this period, the Developers repeatedly 
reaffirmed their commitment to the contract in other ways as 
well. On a number of occasions, Nielsen, a partner of the 
Developers, told Keith Combe that they did not consider him to 
be responsible for the error by the title company and Froerer, 
and would look only to those parties for any liability. 
Further, Nielsen repeatedly stated that the Developers would 
honor the terms of the contract as amended. [Tr., pp. 158-161; 
Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, pp. 44-45] 
32. To give themselves more time to successfully 
develop the project, the Developers asked for and received two 
additional amendments to the Real Estate Contract in February 
of 1984, The first stated that at least 15 acres of the 
Property would be developed as condominiums and partial pay-
ments would be made to the Combes as each unit was sold. 
Further, the Combes were required to subordinate their interest 
in part of the Property so that the Developers could obtain a 
construction loan. The second amendment further extended the 
final payment under the contract until December 31, 1988, if 
the Developers had paid at least $120,000.00 in principal by 
the end of 1985. The Combes received no consideration for 
executing these amendments either. [R. 84-87, 158-161, 
173-174, 204. These amendments are also included in the 
Addendum.] 
33. After extensive redesign work, the Developers 
sought bids for construction of phase I of the project in the 
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Summer of 1984. However, correspondence between the Developers 
and the new engineering firm indicates that the bids were much 
higher than expected. Although some effort was made to trim 
costs, by the Summer of 1984 falling real estate prices made 
the project economically unfeasible. [Tr., pp. 179-180; 
Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, pp. 67-69] 
34. In August 1984, Breuer and Harrison flew to Utah 
and for the first time personally met with Keith Combe. The 
purpose of this meeting was to inform him that unless a sub-
stantial reduction of the purchase price was given, they would 
seek rescission of the contract. This was the first time that 
rescission had been raised. Shortly thereafter the Developers 
filed this lawsuit. [Tr., pp. 187-189, 87] 
35. Subsequent to the Combes' sale to the Developers, 
the real estate market declined drastically, and the value of 
the Property dropped from about $410,000 to about $280,000. 
[Tr. 192-193] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court erred in awarding the Devel-
opers summary judgment on their recission claims. Viewed in 
the light most favorable to the Combes, the record established 
that the Developers, or their agents, knew of the pipeline and 
easement before they executed the contract with the Combes. 
Accordingly, the Developers waived the alleged breach of con-
tract and any claim for damages, as well as recission. 
-18-
(a) Then, the Developers waited nearly five 
years to seek rescission, during which time they made annual 
interest payments, attempted to develop the property, entered 
into contracts to resell the property, and orally and in 
writing amended and reaffirmed the contract. Thus, the Devel-
opers also waived their claims to recission by affirming the 
contract with knowledge of the alleged breach. 
(b) The Developers also are estopped and barred 
by laches from seeking rescission because their delay injured 
the Combes. During this five-year period, the value of the 
Property dramatically declined due to market factors having 
nothing to do with the pipeline. 
(c) Also, the Court improperly resolved factual 
issues created by ambiguities in the Real Estate Contract con-
cerning the scope of warranties of title given by the Combes. 
2. The trial court also erred in summarily disposing 
of the Combes' crossclaims against Froerer and ATGF. The 
facts, viewed in the light most favorably to the Combes, show 
that their attorney, Froerer, committed legal malpractice by 
failing to adequately protect his clients' interests during the 
sale. Further, the facts also established the Combes' claim 
for abstractor's negligence against Froerer and the title 
company because the title search was untimely and negligently 
performed. The Combes relied on the performance of a timely 
and accurate search, to their detriment. The Combes are also 
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entitled to have their claim against ATGF for breach of the 
title insurance policy determined by a jury, due to ambiguities 
in the language of the contract about the scope of coverage. 
3. On the day before the trial, the Court abused its 
discretion in ordering that the Developers' damage claims 
against Froerer and ATGF be severed from the Developers' claims 
for restitutionary damages against the Combes. This was highly 
prejudicial because it prevented the Combes from pursuing their 
defense that any damage to the Developers was caused by Froerer 
and ATGF, rather than the Combes. Also, it gave the Combes 
inadequate time within which to prepare an alternative theory 
of defense. 
4. The trial court also made significant errors in 
the calculation of restitutionary damages and offsets. The 
rent offset allowed by the court was legally inadequate because 
the property was valued at its agricultural use rather than at 
its highest and best use as a residential subdivision. Also, 
the Court refused to consider fair market value in determining 
fair rental value. Finally, there was no legal or equitable 
basis for the award of prejudgment interest and the amount of 
interest was miscalculated. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEVELOPERS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DEVELOPERS' 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PIPELINE CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AS TO WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES, AND 
BECAUSE THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS. 
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The Combes1 defenses to the Developers' claims for 
recission and damages included waiver, estoppel and laches. 
The key issues raised by each of these defenses were the purely 
factual issues of (1) when the Developers learned of the pipe-
line, and (2) whether their delays in asserting rescission, and 
their other actions inconsistent with rescission, were 
unreasonable. 
Factual issues also were created by the ambiguities in 
the Real Estate Contract concerning what warranties of title 
the Developers were receiving. For example, if the unnamed 
escrow agent was supposed to give only special warranty deeds, 
as provided by paragraph 4 of the contract, these would not 
cover the pipeline easement created even before the Combes took 
title. Further ambiguities as to the scope of warranties were 
created by paragraph 5. 
On the issue of when the Developers learned of the 
pipeline, they contended that they didn't know about it until 
February, 1983. However, the drawings prepared by the Devel-
opers' engineers showed the existence of the pipeline and ease-
ment even before the Developers agreed to purchase the property 
in December, 1979. Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 15, 22. If 
this evidence were accepted by a finder of fact, not only did 
the Developers waive any claims for recission, they also waived 
or were estopped from asserting the breach itself, and any 
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claim for damages as well. See, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1980), Leone v. Zuniqa, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699 (1934). 
Even if the Developers didn't learn of the pipeline 
until after they entered into the purchase agreement, there was 
also evidence in the record that they knew of the pipeline from 
the drawings of their own engineers before they took numerous 
actions affirming the contract. These actions included 
attempts to resell the Property, continued efforts to develop 
it, payment of interest in 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, and exe-
cution of the various amendments to the contracts in 1982, 1983 
and 1984. Again, if this evidence were accepted by a finder of 
fact, at least the recission claims were waived, or were barred 
by estoppel or laches. Id. 
In granting the Developers* Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, the Court itself acknowledged that M[t]here is a dispute 
of fact as to the exact date at which the buyers became aware 
of the existence of the easement and became aware of the exis-
tence of the aquaduct." Finding of Fact No. 11, R. 512. None-
theless, and in spite of the contrary evidence in the record, 
the Court improperly decided that factual issue. The Court 
found that M[t]he easement was not shown on any sketches or 
plat maps given to the buyers prior to the time that they pur-
chased the property'1 [Finding No. 23, R. 514], and that M[t]he 
first time the easement was shown on any drawings prepared by 
Great Basin Engineering was after the new title report was 
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given by the sellers to the buyers' agent in 1983". [Finding 
No. 24, R. 514] 
The Court also impermissibly resolved the ambiguities 
in the Real Estate Contract created by the conflicts between 
the warranties of title in paragraph 8 and the disclaimer of 
all warranties in paragraph 5. Further, the Court overlooked 
the reference to special warranty deeds in paragraph 4. See, 
Finding No. 12 [R. 512], amended to change it to a conclusion 
of law. [R. 554] 
Even if the Combes' contentions concerning contractual 
ambiguities and concerning the Developers' knowledge of the 
pipeline are ignored, the Developers' own contention that they 
didn't learn of the pipeline until February, 1983 created addi-
tional factual issues concerning waiver, estoppel and laches 
that also could not be resolved by summary judgment. After 
February, 1983, the Developers still waited for 18 months 
before first asserting any right to recission. In the mean-
time, they executed two amendments to the contract in 1984, 
made two interest payments, continued their attempts to develop 
the property, and represented to the Combes through Nielsen 
that they intended to honor the contract and were considering 
claims only against Froerer and ATGF. [Deposition of Nielsen, 
R. 1420, pp. 44-45, Tr. 160-161] 
There is no question that the above evidence estab-
lished the elements of waiver, which were the Developers' 
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intentional relinquishment of a known right. See, Hunter v. 
Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) [quoting American Savings 
and Loan Ass'n v. Blomguist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 
(1968)]. Also, the Developers could not prevent this waiver 
from occurring by secretly reserving their right to rescind: 
The unexpressed, subjective reasons for the relin-
quishment of a right are largely irrelevant. M[T]he 
guestion whether waiver will be found in any particu-
lar case depends not upon the secret intention of the 
party against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect 
which his conduct has had upon the other party." 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver section 158 at 843 
(1966). Stated another way, one cannot prevent a 
waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an 
intent to waive, where his or her actions clearly 
indicate such an intent, (citations omitted). 
B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food Service, 82 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35, 37 (Utah App. 1988). Furthermore, waiver is almost 
always a factual issue to be resolved at trial and not on a 
motion for summary judgment. Jd., Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226 (Utah App. 1988). 
A finder of fact could have reasonably found that any 
delay in asserting recission, and any actions inconsistent with 
an intent to rescind were fatal to the Developers' recission 
claim: 
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the 
option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover 
the purchase price or to affirm the transaction and 
recover damages. . . 
As to the finding of waiver, the court in Chester 
v. McDaniel [504 P.2d 726, 727-728 (Or. 1972)] pointed 
out certain important distinctions in the type of 
waiver involved. The court observed, any delay on the 
part of the defrauded party, especially his remaining 
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in possession of the property received by him under 
the contract, and dealing with it as his own, may 
constitute a waiver of the right to rescind the 
contract. 
Dugan v. Jones, supra, 615 P.2d 1247. See also, Perry v. 
Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 1968) (attempting 
to renegotiate contract after learning of grounds for recission 
constituted waiver). Recission claims have been rejected based 
upon delays less than the 18 months alleged by the Developers 
here, let alone the five years claimed by the Combes. For 
example in Frailey v, McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840 
(1949), this Court held that a ten month delay, while the 
purchaser tried to transfer his water rights to another loca-
tion, was too long. See also, Zuniga v. Leone, 77 Utah 
494, 297 P. 1010 (1931), (a one year delay, during which the 
original contract was amended, was too long); McKellar Real 
Estate & Investment v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128 (1923) (a 
six month period during which the buyer occupied the property 
constituted a waiver). 
Whether the Developers' delay in asserting recission 
is measured from December, 1979, or February, 1983, evidence in 
the record also established the prejudice to the Combes from 
that delay, required for a finding of estoppel. See, Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 
(Utah 1979). See also, Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 
1983). Based upon the decline in the real estate market during 
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these periods, the value of the property plummeted.—' [Tr. 
pp. 184-185, R. 1394; Deposition of Nielsen, R. 1420, p. 17] 
Similarly, the harm to the Combes resulting from the 
Developers' lack of diligence in asserting their rights was 
sufficient for a finding of laches. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). See also, Papanikolas Brothers Enter-
prises v. Suqarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1975). Had the Developers sought recission immediately, 
the Combes would have had the opportunity to resell the 
property for an amount that could have made all parties whole, 
especially since the pipeline and easement did not signifi-
cantly affect the value of the property. [Tr. 269] Moreover, 
-' Similar situations arose in the past, when 
declining real estate values prompted claims for rescission, 
most notably during the Depression era. Then, as now, the 
courts have uniformly refused to allow the purchasers to 
rescind under those facts. Pesciarelli v. Trestain, 284 N.W. 
656 (Mich. 1939); Browne v. Briggs Commercial and Development 
Company, 259 N.W. 886 (Mich. 1935); Berg v. Hessey, 256 N.W. 
562 (Mich. 1934); Schafroth v. Ross, 289 F. 703 (8th Cir. 
1923); Payne v. Baldock, 287 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App. 1956); Kauf-
hold v. Cador Construction Company, 156 A. 125 (N.J. 1931); 
Griffin v. Axsom, 525 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. App. 1988). The atti-
tude of the courts in those cases was best summed up in Davis 
v. Albertson, 172 So. 241, 242 (Florida 1937): 
In fact, he [the chancellor] was confronted 
by a suit growing out of a typical boom time 
transaction in which a zealous purchaser 
paid too dearly for his whistle and after 
the frolic was over and sanity restored 
insisted that his vendor pay for the 
confetti. 
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had the developers stopped making payments immediately, the 
amount needed to make them whole (including items such as the 
prejudgment interest that was awarded) would have been much 
less. Instead, the Developers lulled the Combes into believing 
that the real estate contract would be honored and payments 
could be accepted. 
Certainly, all of these circumstances surrounding the 
Developers' delays would have to be weighed in order to deter-
mine the factual issues of whether those delays were unreason-
able and whether equity required the Developers to bear the 
risk of loss they caused by sitting on their rights. These 
issues, and the ambiguities in the real estate contract, could 
not be resolved by summary judgment. It was error for the 
District Court to do so, and that error must be reversed. 
II. 
FACTUAL ISSUES ALSO BARRED THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING THE COMBES' CLAIMS AGAINST FROERER AND ATGF 
Froerer was hired and paid by the Combes to draft all 
documentation for the transfers of parcels between the Combe 
siblings, to draft the preliminary and final real estate con-
tracts with the Developers, and to conduct the title search and 
procure the title insurance policy required by the latter 
contracts. By performing or agreeing to perform these tasks, 
Froerer assumed several distinct but interrelated duties to the 
Combes, on behalf of both himself and ATGF. One set of duties 
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was as the Combes' attorney. Another set was as an abstractor 
of title and agent of ATGF, while still retaining his duties as 
the Combes' attorney. A third set was as ATGF's agent for 
issuance of the title policy, while also still acting as the 
Combes' attorney. 
In dismissing all of the Combes' claims against 
Froerer and ATGF, the Court entirely overlooked the Combes' 
legal malpractice claim against Froerer, and the impact that 
the malpractice claim had on the abstractor's negligence and 
title policy claims. The Court's ruling did not even address 
the malpractice claim. [R. 878] 
The Court dismissed the abstractor's negligence and 
title policy claims on the theory that the duties of Froerer 
and ATGF ran only to the Developers. [R. 878] However, the 
Court failed to take into account that Froerer undertook to 
search title and issue a title policy not just as an agent of 
ATGF, or for the sole benefit of the Developers, but also as 
the Combes' attorney, and to protect their interests as well. 
Also, as with the Developers' prior motion for summary 
judgment, the Court again failed to take into account contrac-
tual ambiguities, this time in the policy of title insurance. 
The factual issues created by these ambiguities in the scope of 
title insurance coverage, and by Froerer's tangled relation-
ships with the Combes, ATGF and the Developers, made summary 
judgment totally inappropriate. 
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A. The Combes Demonstrated a Prima Facie Claim 
of Legal Malpractice Against Froerer. 
It is rarely appropriate for a claim of legal malprac-
tice to be resolved on a motion for summary judgment: 
An attorney is required to possess the 
legal knowledge and skills common to members 
of his profession, Young v. Bridwell, 20 
Ut.2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690 (1968), 
and to represent its clients interest with 
competence and diligence. Dunn v. McKay 
Burden, McMurray & Thurman, Utah, 584 P.2d 
894, 896 (1978). 
Ordinarily, whether a defendant has 
breached the required standard of care is a 
question of fact for the jury. FMA Accep-
tance Company v. Leatherby Insurance 
Company, Utah 594 P02d 1332 (1979); Jensen 
v. Dolan, 12 Ut.2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 
(1962). Consequently, a Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied where the evidence 
presents a genuine issue of material fact, 
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving 
party, would entitle him to a judgment as a 
matter of law. . . [citations omitted]. A 
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the 
basis of the facts and the record, reason-
able minds could differ on whether defen-
dant's conduct measures up to the required 
standard. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Ut.2d 
292, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967); FMA Accept-
ance Company v. Leatherby Insurance Company, 
Supra. 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) 
Here, there were at least three different aspects of 
co-defendant Froererfs representation of the Combes which 
reasonably could be construed as malpractice. First, and 
perhaps most crucial, Froerer failed to complete the title work 
prior to the real estate closing. He was hired by the Combes, 
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and paid by them from the proceeds of the sale, to do a timely 
title search. This title work was an extension of the legal 
work he did for them in drafting the very contracts that made 
it so important that the title search be completed in a timely 
fashion. An untimely title search was the same as no title 
search at all, on the facts of this case. 
Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct mandates 
that Ma lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness in representing a client1'. Although the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct were not adopted until January 1, 1988, Rule 1.3 
basically reiterates Disciplinary Rule 6-10l(A)(3) and EC 6.4 
of the former Code of Professional Responsibility. Froerer's 
failure to timely complete a task which was essential to his 
clients' interests was negligence on its face. 
This nonfeasance was compounded by Froerer's admitted 
errors in failing to perform the search adequately once he 
finally got around to it. Deposition of Froerer, R. 1418, pp. 
25-26. His failure to uncover a recorded encumbrance against 
the property was negligence as a matter of law. White v. 
Western Title Insurance Co., 710 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1985); Moore v. 
Title Insurance Company of Minnesota, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. App. 
1985) . 
Second, Froerer was negligent in withholding material 
information from the Combes. An attorney has a fiduciary obli-
gation to share all important, material information with his 
client: 
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A client is entitled to all of the 
information helpful to his cause within his 
attorney's command. If an attorney negli-
gently or wilfully withholds from his client 
information material to the client's deci-
sion to pursue a given course of action, or 
to abstain therefrom, then the attorney is 
liable for the client's losses suffered as a 
result of action taken without benefit of 
the undisclosed material facts. Material 
facts are those which, if known to the 
client, might well have caused him, acting 
as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed 
course of conduct. 
Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F.Supp. 30, 39, (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
See also, Burien Motors Inc. v. Balch, 513 P.2d 582, (Wash. 
App. 1973); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 
(1962). Here, Froerer failed to tell the Combes that the title 
work had not been completed prior to the closing. Instead, he 
allowed the Combes to go ahead with the sale under the mistaken 
impression that they would be able to comply with the terms of 
the contract he drafted. 
This omission compounded Froerer's earlier failure to 
explain to the Combes their obligations, and potential liabili-
ties, under the warranty provisions in paragraph 8 of the Real 
Estate Contract. Such an explanation was vital because the 
Combes were inexperienced in real estate transactions, as 
Froerer knew or should have known. 
Third, Froerer also breached the duty he owed to the 
Combes as his clients by simultaneously representing another 
client with conflicting interests, and by failing to both 
inform the Combes of this conflict and obtain their consent. 
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Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Utah 1985). See 
also, Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and Disci-
plinary Rule 5-105(c) of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Froerer admitted that he was representing Steve Keil, 
the real estate agent who was the Developer's agent, and who 
was, or would shortly become, their partner. Yet, Froerer also 
understood that he had been hired by the Combes to perform all 
the work necessary to complete the transaction, and was to be 
paid by the Combes for that work. [R-1418, pp. 6-7, 39-40, 
46-47] Nonetheless, Froerer never even discussed the conflict 
with the Combes, nor advised them to obtain independent counsel 
to review the underlying documents and obligations. Rather, he 
allowed the Combes to go ahead with the closing believing that 
he was protecting their interests. [Deposition of Combe, R. 
1416, p. 94] 
It is almost impossible for an attorney to adequately 
protect the interests of both the buyer and the seller in a 
real estate transaction. Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corpora-
tion, Inc., 586 P.2d 1378 (Idaho 1978). Indeed, the Committee 
on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association has 
opined that representation of both the buyer and seller in a 
real estate transaction is likely to present an irreconcilable 
conflict for the attorney. Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650, 653 
(Idaho 1982). This conflict of interest arises even if the 
attorney's role is limited to determining the marketability of 
title: 
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Even within the limited area of marketable 
title, a situation may exist which cast 
doubts on the advisability of accepting the 
title. The buyer's attorney would be under 
a duty to request the seller to correct the 
situation, whereas the seller might properly 
contend that the title was marketable, not-
withstanding the buyer's assertion. It 
would certainly be most difficult for one 
attorney under such circumstances to repre-
sent both clients with 'undivided fidelity.' 
In the matter of Daniel W. Kamp, 194 A2d 236, 239 (N.J. 1963). 
Here, the Court attempted to side-step the malpractice 
issue by making the factual determination that "Froerer pre-
pared the paperwork; he did not handle the closing." [R. 880] 
Not only was this finding contradicted by evidence in the 
record that Froerer did handle the closing [Froerer Deposition, 
R. 1418, pp. 6-8, 18-20, 51, Exhibit 8], it missed the point. 
There was no dispute that Froerer did substantial legal work on 
the transaction. The issues were whom he was representing and 
whether he breached the standard of care. These were purely 
factual issues on which summary judgment should not have been 
awarded. 
Evidently, Judge Hyde himself was troubled or confused 
by his summary judgment on the malpractice claim. At the con-
clusion of the trial on other issues, he stated that this claim 
had not been the subject of the earlier summary judgment dis-
posing of the abstractor's negligence and title policy claims: 
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The Court: He [Combe] hasn't been stopped 
from [pursuing his claims against] Froerer. 
Mr. Ashton: Yes, you ruled in that regard. 
The Court: I ruled in regard to him not 
being a beneficiary of that. . . . 
The Court: If he's got a negligence action 
against Froerer, that isn't what I was 
ruling on. We were talking about him coming 
under the title policy. 
[Tr. 418] 
Nonetheless, the judge subsequently reaffirmed his 
earlier error in dismissing the malpractice claim. [Rulings on 
Motions, November 25, 1987, R. 1176] That error must be 
reversed, because the Combes were entitled to a jury trial on 
the factual issues presented by their malpractice claims 
against Froerer. 
B. Factual Issues also Precluded Summary Judgment on 
the Combes' Claim against Froerer and ATGF for 
Abstractor's Negligence. 
By agreeing to perform the title search, Froerer was 
not only acting as the Combes' attorney, but also as an agent 
for the title company, ATGF. In their role as title abstrac-
tors, Froerer and his principal, ATGF, owed a separate duty to 
the Combes to complete the search in an accurate and timely 
manner. 
In issuing or agreeing to issue a title report, a 
title company assumes different responsibilities than those 
covered by the title insurance contract. Moore v. Title 
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Insurance Company of Minnesota, supra. The company acts as an 
abstractor and has a duty to list in the title report all 
matters of public record that affect the title. This duty is 
in addition to the company's contractual duties on a policy of 
title insurance. Id. at 1307. See also, Jarchow v. Trans-
america Title Insurance Company, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. App. 
1975). Further, a title insurer has the duties of a title 
abstractor when it inspects title records, even for purposes of 
issuance of a title policy. See, Heyd v. Chicago Title Insur-
ance Company, 354 N.W. 2d 154 (Neb. 1984); Banville v. Schmidt, 
37 Cal. App. 3d 92 (Cal. App. 1974.) 
The abstractor clearly owes these duties to the 
parties with whom he is in contractual privity, such as the 
Combes here, who paid Froerer's abstracting fee. Sickler v. 
Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 195 So. 197 (Fla. 1940). 
See also, First American Title Insurance Company, Inc. v. First 
Title Service Company of the Florida Keys, Inc., 457 So. 2d 467 
(Fla. 1984). However, those duties also extend to all others 
who forseeably may rely upon the title search, regardless of 
contractual privity8 
As explained in First American Title Insurance 
Company, Inc. v. First Title Service Company of the Florida 
Keys, Inc., supra, third party beneficiary principles apply to 
a title search: 
When an abstract is prepared in the know-
ledge or under conditions in which an 
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abstractor should reasonably expect that the 
employer is to provide it to third persons 
for purposes of inducing those persons to 
rely on the abstract as evidence of title, 
the abstractors contractual duty to perform 
the service skillfully and diligently runs 
to the benefit of such known third parties. 
Id, at 472. See also, Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983); Williams v. Polgar, 
215 N.W. 2d 149, (Mich. 1974); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 
263 S.E. 2d 313 (N.C. 1980); Restatement of Torts 2d, 
§ 552. Thus, even if the abstractor's contract is with the 
buyer of the property, the abstractor's duties also run to the 
seller, as the third party most likely to rely on the search. 
See, Malinak v. Safeco Title Insurance Company of Idaho, 661 
P.2d 12 (Mont. 1983); Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. 
Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973); Chun v. Park, 462 P.2d 905 
(Hawaii 1969) (title company owed duty to seller, buyers, and 
bank). 
Accordingly, there is no question that Froerer owed 
the Combes a duty to perform a timely and accurate title 
search, since they were both parties with whom he was in 
privity and parties whom he knew would rely on the search. 
There is also no question that in failing to timely discover or 
report the recorded pipeline easement, Froerer was negligent as 
a matter of law. White v. Western Title Insurance Co., supra. 
His liability is also imputed to ATGF as a matter of law. See, 
Restatement Second, Agency, § 219. 
-36-
However, Froerer and ATGF argued in the District Court 
that the Combes did not rely on his title search, because he 
never issued a title report, and the title policy was not 
issued until after closing. In effect, Froerer and ATGF argued 
that Froerer's negligence in failing to perform the search 
before closing was a defense to his negligence in conducting an 
inadequate search. Although this argument is ludicrous, it 
apparently was accepted by the District Court, which found that 
there was "no indication that the Combes relied upon any cer-
tificate and/or search." See, Rulings on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 880. What the District Court's ruling overlooked 
was the evidence in the record that Froerer's actions led the 
Combes to believe that he had already conducted the title 
search and issued the title policy, and that they had clear, 
marketable title to the Property. [Deposition of Combe, R. 
1411, pp. 42-44; Tr. 317-319] 
At miniumum, there was a factual issue about whether 
it was reasonable for the Combes to rely on Froerer to advise 
them if the title search was not completed prior to closing, or 
if title defects were discovered, especially since he acted as 
their attorney in drafting the contract that required the 
search be done. Accordingly, the summary judgment on the 
abstractor's negligence claims must be reversed as well. 
C. Ambiguities in the Terms of the Title Insurance 
Policy Concerning Whether the Combes were 
Insureds also Created Factual Issues Making 
Summary Judgment Improper. 
-37-
The District Court also found that the Combes had no 
claim against ATGF based on the title insurance policy, because 
only the Developers were insured under the policy. R. 880. In 
making this finding, the Court ignored the plain language of 
Schedule A of the policy. Schedule A (contained in the adden-
dum) insured the interest of the Combes as well as the Devel-
opers, or was at least ambiguous on this point. 
In interpreting a document, the "first source of 
inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its 
entirety." Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). Paragraph number 1 of Schedule A 
states that the estate or interest covered by the policy is "an 
interest pursuant to that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract" 
between the Combes and the Developers. This should be con-
strued as a reference to the Combes' interest, as well as to 
the Developers' interest, since the Combes retained legal title 
to the property. See, Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227 
(Utah 1983). Also, paragraph number 2 states that the "estate 
or interest referred to herein" is vested in the Combes. If 
the policy was intended to insure only the Developers' 
interest, paragraph number 1 should have referred only to the 
"equitable estate" created by the Real Estate Contract. 
Further, paragraph 2 should have stated that the insured 
interest was vested in the Developers and not in the Combes. 
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Another basic rule of contract construction is that 
whenever possible a contract should be interpreted so as to 
give effect to all of its provisions. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 
P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). An insurance contract should also be 
construed against the insurer. See, Fuller v. Director of 
Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1985). Therefore, the title 
policy should have been construed as insuring the Combes' 
interest, as well as the Developers'. The District Court's 
contrary construction that only the Developers' interest was 
insured ignored the language of Schedule A, and the rule of 
construction against insurers. 
At the very least, the contract was ambiguous, and the 
intent of the contract was a question of fact for the jury. 
Bartlam v. Tikka, 622 P.2d 1133, (Or. App. 1981). A jury 
should have been allowed to determine the meaning of the con-
tract, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
on the Combes' claim for breach of the title insurance policy. 
III. 
BECAUSE BIFURCATION OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL TO 
THE COMBES, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
After the Developers' motion for summary judgment was 
granted in mid-1986, the Combes' repeatedly attempted to get 
the remaining issues to trial. These efforts were blocked by 
the Developers, ATGF and Froerer, who on three occasions 
objected to trial settings. [R. 576, 582, 605, 620, 626, 632, 
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683, 698] Each time, those parties claimed that they needed 
additional time to complete discovery and prepare for trial. 
Finally, a trial date of September 21, 1987 was scheduled based 
on the agreement of the parties. Then, on the day before 
trial, the plaintiffs and co-defendants Froerer and ATGF 
jointly moved to bifurcate and continue the trial as to plain-
tiffs' claims against those two co-defendants. [R. 996, 1406] 
No substantial reasons were offered as to why those 
claims should have been severed. Instead, it was inaccurately 
stated that the cause of action against Froerer and ATGF was 
"separate and apart" from those against the Combes. Also, it 
was claimed, again inaccurately, that different "factual 
evidence" was involved. [R. 996-997; Transcript of Bifurcation 
Hearing, R. 1406, pp. 32, 34, 35] No showing was made, how-
ever, that a bifurcated trial would be more convenient, foster 
judicial economy, or most important, avoid injustice. Most 
disturbingly, the severance eliminated the Combes' defenses 
based on the wrongdoing of Froerer and ATGF and gave the Combes 
inadequate opportunity to prepare new theories of defense. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, taken as a whole, 
favor the resolution of issues in a single, consolidated 
action. See, Rules 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, and 42(a); 
Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 20 F.R.D. 204 
(D. Neb., 1957). Although a court may order the separate trial 
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of issues or claims, it may do so only in "furtherance of con-
venience or to avoid prejudice. . .M for all parties involved. 
U.R.C.P., Rule 42(b); Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1981). 
The piecemeal trial of issues is not preferred and 
should be ordered only when it is clearly necessary to avoid 
prejudice and foster judicial economy. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 
83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979); 5 Moore's Federal Practice 
1f 42-38; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure; Civil 
§ 2388. Moreover, when a plaintiff has sued more than one 
defendant for the same losses, severance of the claims is 
usually denied, even if based on different, and possibly con-
fusing, theories of liability. C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, 
Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1969); 
Durham v. Southern Railway Co., 254 F.Supp. 813 (W.D, Vir. 
1966); Wright & Miller, supra. 
Although a decision to order separate trials is dis-
cretionary, that decision must be reversed where discretion is 
abused, as here. Columbia Irrigation District v. U.S., 268 
F.2d 128 (9th Cir., 1959); Franchi Const. Co. v. Combined Ins. 
Co. of America, 580 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Peatross v. Board 
of Com'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) (dis-
cretionary decisions should be reversed where they are arbi-
trary & capricious); Coca Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 
690 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
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A discretionary decision which prejudices a litigant 
constitutes just such an abuse: 
As is true of any other kind of judicial 
discretion, it is subject to abuse, and it 
is appropriate for us to remand for separate 
trials if it appears the prejudice to any 
litigant, from consolidation, far out weighs 
the benefit. 
Liqnell v. Berg 593 P.2d 800, 806 (Utah 1979). Although 
Liqnell dealt with consolidation as opposed to bifurcation, the 
same reasoning applies here. If a separate trial prejudices 
the party "against" whom it is sought, while a consolidated 
trial would be fair to all litigants, it is an abuse of discre-
tion to grant such a request. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Com-
pany, 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980); Eichinger v. Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Co., supra; State Mutual Life Assurance 
Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) . 
Here, bifurcation of the trial was extremely prejudi-
cial to the Combes. Because the true parties at fault, Froerer 
and ATGF, were not present, there was no alternative but to 
view the Combes as the culpable parties. Not only were Froerer 
and ATGF absent, but the Court also precluded any reference to 
them. [Tr. 3, 6] Thus an incomplete tableau was presented at 
trial. 
The issue to be tried against the Combes was one of 
equitable damages. Therefore, the Combes were entitled to have 
the trier of fact hear all the evidence and "use whatever 
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factors it finds most appropriate to achieve justice." Johnson 
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1977). Instead, the trier 
of fact was prevented from seeing that the real basis for 
rescission was a faulty title report; that the Developers pur-
chased title insurance to guard against the very circumstance 
which occurred here, and that Froerer and ATGF were liable for 
the Developers' losses. In short, equity demanded that the 
trial include all of the parties so that liability could be 
distributed equitably. 
Also, because the bifurcation occurred literally on 
the eve of trial, the Combes were prevented from adopting a 
different trial strategy, reflecting the fact that they would 
be the only defendants at trial. 
Thus, upon remand, a single consolidated trial of all 
issues should be ordered. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE AMOUNT OF 
RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES AWARDED TO THE DEVELOPERS. 
As the result of the above trial, the Second Revised 
Judgment was entered requiring the Combes to pay the developers 
over $370,000,00. This sum included the one $75,000.00 prin-
cipal payment made by the Developers, four annual interest pay-
ments of $35,000.00 each, some tax payments, and prejudgment 
interest in the amount of $133,192.64. Prejudgment interest 
was calculated at 6 percent per annum on payments made through 
May 6, 1981, and at 10 percent per annum on payments made 
thereafter. 
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Although the trial court found that the highest and 
best use of the property was for residential development (R. 
1330), the Combes were awarded a rental offset in the amount of 
only $7500 ($1500 per year). The trial court concluded that 
the "fair rental value" for the property should be based on the 
lowest valued use of the land, agricultural use, even though 
the Developers purchased the Property for residential develop-
ment and the pipeline did not interfere with that development. 
The trial court also refused to award an offset for the 
$15,000.00 that the developers had received when they attempted 
to resell the property in 1980. 
As a result of the trial court's rulings, the Combes 
received back property which was worth approximately 
$280,000.00; which was less than what they are required to pay 
the Developers. [Tr. 193-194] 
A. The Court Made a Legal Error in Concluding That 
the Fair Rental Value of the Property Had No 
Relationship to Its Fair Market Value at Its 
Highest and Best Use. 
Prior to trial the Developers filed a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude all evidence and testimony as to the fair 
market value of the subject property. [R. 927] The Court 
denied this motion, and at the beginning of trial stated that 
the fair rental value to be credited to the Combes was directly 
related to the property's fair market value. [Tr. 6-7; 
R. 1406, p. 90] 
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During trial, the Combes' expert, William Christensen, 
testified in detail that the fair rental value of real property 
must be calculated based on a reasonable rate of return on an 
investment equalling the fair market value of the property at 
its highest and best use: 
Q. Now, tell me in what way the actual value of the 
property affects the fair market rental value. 
A. Well, simply stated, whenever you have something 
of value, you can either get a return on it or not, as 
you choose. But typically, if you convert something 
to cash and invest it in something that is paying some 
return, you will get a fair market return on the 
property. And that, in essence, is the concept of 
what fair market rent would be, what is a fair return 
on the value of the property. 
[Tr. 274-275] 
Christensen then explained that, here, fair market 
value was established by the contract price, and fair rental 
value was established by the interest on that amount at the 
contract rate: 
Q. Did you look at the general terms of the contract? 
A. I looked at the general terms. . . . 
Q. Would you have any reason to believe that the 
payment amount as shown in there for interest on the 
property would be a reflection of the fair rental 
value? 
A. Yes, it would be, as a matter of fact. 
[Tr. 278] Christensen further explained that calculating 
rental value as a percentage of fair market value was often 
done by the power company in compensating a landowner for a 
temporary taking. [Tr. 283-284] 
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Notwithstanding this testimony, and the absence of any 
contrary evidence, Judge Hyde disavowed his pre-trial ruling, 
and concluded that the fair rental value of the property had no 
relationship to its market value, at least at its highest and 
best use. As a result, the Combes were credited with yearly 
rent of only $1,500.00, although the property had a value of 
over $400,000.00 when the contract was executed, even with the 
pipeline easement. [Tr. 269] 
This result violated Utah law as set forth in Warner 
v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985) and a host of other Utah 
cases. See also, Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977); 
Perkins v, Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); Soffe v. 
Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983). All of these cases, which 
deal with the enforceability of liquidated damage provisions of 
real estate contracts, have grappled with the very matter at 
issue here: How do you calculate the fair rental value for 
property held by a buyer during an executory contract? 
In these cases the Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
concluded that fair rental value is a function of market value: 
Moreover, as we noted in Biesinger v. 
Behunin, M[f]air rental value necessarily 
represents reasonable return (interest) on 
investment." The interest and rental value 
of the property are merely alternative 
methods of measuring the same thing, i.e., 
the value of the use of the property during 
the period of buyers occupancy. 
Warner v. Rasmussen, supra at 562. Thus, as a matter of law, 
fair rental value equals a reasonable return on the market 
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value of the property as established by the contract price, and 
is calculated as the annual interest due on the unpaid balance 
of the contract, at the contract rate. See also, Johnson v. 
Carman, supra at 374; Soffe v. Ridd, supra. 
The holding of these cases is applicable here because 
the same principles are involved in calculating the amount that 
would have reasonably compensated the Combes for loss of the 
value of their property during the Developers' occupancy. As 
the court explained in Warner, a reasonable return on the 
investment does not constitute a windfall to the seller but 
merely represents the buyer's "cost" of using a valuable asset. 
In sum, the interest payments made by the Developers 
here were merely the fair rental value of the Property during 
their occupancy. As a matter of law, it was error for the 
District Court to order that those payments be refunded by the 
Combes. 
B. The Award of Prejudgment Interest Must be 
Stricken, Or Substantially Reduced. 
The award of $133,192.64 in prejudgment interest, 
which is over half of the total payments made by the Developer 
under the Contract, was grossly inequitable. The judge failed 
to "look to the totality of the circumstances to make his 
determination of what was just and equitable between the 
parties." Stewart v. K & S Company, Inc., 591 P.2d 433, 435 
(Utah 1979). Even if the Developers' five year delay in 
asserting their recission claim was not a total bar to that 
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claim, it was certainly a factor that equity required the 
District Court to consider in determining equitable damages. 
During this period, the value of the Property dropped dramati-
cally, and it is now worth only a fraction of its original 
value. Indeed, its value now, as returned to the Combes, is 
less than the amount that the Combes are required to return to 
the Developers, when the huge award of prejudgment interest is 
included. 
None of these factors was considered by the District 
Court. Instead, the District Court required the Combes to bear 
all risk of loss caused by the Developers' inequitable conduct, 
and rewarded the Developers for that conduct by giving them a 
return on investment that included interest on interest. 
The District Court also failed to consider that it was 
the Developers who caused the repeated delays in bringing this 
matter to trial. However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
a prevailing party who delays proceedings, or even merely 
acquiesces in delays, may not be awarded prejudgment interest. 
Nielsen v. Drobay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
Also, even if an award of prejudgment interest had 
been proper, it was miscalculated. In S.C.M. Land Company v. 
Watkins and Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 109 (Utah 1986) the Court held 
that prejudgment interest should be calculated at the statutory 
interest rate in effect at the time the contract was executed. 
Here, as in SCM, the statutory rate when the contract was 
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executed was not ten percent per year, but only six percent per 
year. Also, prejudgment interest should not have been awarded 
on amounts that, as argued above, should not have been refunded 
to the Developers. Accordingly, not only did the District 
Court err in awarding any prejudgment interest, the Court mis-
calculated the interest it awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Combes respectfully urge that 
the summary judgments must be reversed and this matter remanded 
for a single trial on all claims between the Developers and the 
Combes and all claims between the Combes and co-defendants 
Froerer and ATGF. Alternatively, the damage and prejudgment 
interest awards must be stricken, or remanded to the District 
Court for new trial or recalculation, with directions to the 
District Court to apply the appropriate equitable and legal 
factors. 
DATED this M day of May, 1989. 
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REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this 29 clay of December ' 
A.D., 197° , bv and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his j 
wife, anS^FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee, ! 
hereinafter designated as Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER and j 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California, hereinafter desig- I 
nated as the Buyer. j 
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration j 
herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the Buyer, and the j 
Buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase I 
the following described real property, situate in the County of ! 
Weber, State of Utah, to-wit: j 
See Schedule A attached hereto and made a part j 
hereof. 
1. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession ; 
and pay for said described premises the sum of FOUR HUNDRED TEN 
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY ($410,880.00) DOLLARS, (the exact | 
purchase price to be determined after survey; the purchase price ,' 
to be determined by multiplying the number of acres by $21,4 00.00),' 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 
_^_^_^___
 i , strictly within the j 
following rimes, to-wit: SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($75,000.00) I 
DOLLARS cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and 1 
the balance of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED j 
EIGHTY ($335,880.00) DOLLARS shall be paid as follows: J 
i 
Buyer shall pay to Seller interest only for the ! 
first four (4) years of this' contract payable on ! 
the 31st day of December, beginning December 31, j 
1980. On December 31, 1983, Seller shall pay the j 
balance of the purchase price, principal and ; 
interest in full. j 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to Buyer on the j 
31 day of December, 197 9. j 
2. Said payments are to be applied first to the payment! 
of interest and second to the reduction of the principal. 
Interest shall be charged from December 31 , 1979 on ail unpaid 
portions of the purchase price at the rate of TEN AND ONE-HALF 
(10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum. j 
3. The Buyer hereby agrees to pay a late fee of Four (4 5 
Percent of any payment that is paid Fifteen (15) Days after the | 
date such payment is due. 
i 
4. In order to facilitate the performance of the terms j 
and conditions of this agreement and to allow for the orderly | 
subdivision and development of said property by the Buyer, the j 
Seller and Buyer agree that an escrow-trust agreement designating J 
(to be mutually designated at a later date), as Escrow Agent-Trustt 
with appropriate instructions to act in such capacity shall be 
executed by the parties. Seller shall forthwith execute and ! 
deliver to said trustee a good and sufficient Warranty Deed j 
conveying subject property to said Trustee, with authority for j 
said Trustee to record said conveyance and to thereafter convey i 
title by Special Warranty Deed to Buyer upon 3uyer's compliance • 
with the terms and conditions herein set forth and as specifically! 
provided for in said Escrow-Trust Agreement. Said escrow 1 
I 
agreement shall provide authority to said Trustee to execute and j 
deliver deeds of reconveyance back to the Seller in the event i 
Buyer defaults. i 
a. Such Trustee herein is authorized and instructed! 
to sign and execute, at the request of Buyer, any and all sub- i 
division plats, protective covenants, easements, and rights-of-
way which may be necessary or convenient for the orderly develop- I 
ment of the subject property, upon presentation of the same by 
the Buyer by its duly authorized representatives. 
b. The Escrow Holder-Trustee to be authorized and | 
empowered to convey all, or part, of said property to Buyer for 
the purpose of obtaining financing for cost of installation of the 
required off-site improvements throughout the subdivision. In 
addition, said construction mortgage or trust deed for the 
financing of said off-site improvements shall not be an amount 
to exceed the engineer's estimated cost in accordance with bids 
received from reliable contractors for the construction of such 
improvements, and provided Trustee shall be immediately reconveyed 
all of the subject property herein after the execution and 
recordation of any such trust deed or mortgage executed by 
obligation or encumbrance. It is fully understood and agreed, 
however, that Trustee will assume no obligation nor liability 
for the repayment of any such loan, and that ail such loan pro-
ceeds shall be under the control of a reliable lending institution 
to insure compliance that such funds are expended solely for the 
purpose of the construction of the required off-site improvements, 
and for no other purpose. Seller, Buyer and Escrow-Trustee shall 
have the right, upon request, to have an audit of expenditures of 
all such loan proceeds. Such off-site improvements may include 
engineering, road, water system, sewer, curb and gutter, sidewalk, 
storm sewer and land fill. 
c. Neither Seller nor Escrow Holder-Trustee shall 
be under any obligation to incur any expense in connection with 
the planning, laying out, approval or development of the subject 
property, and Buyer agrees to hold Seller and Escrow Holder-Trusted 
harmless from any liability in connection with such development. 
Neither Escrow Holder-Trustee nor Seller are in any way engaged 
in the selling of any lots or improved property hereunder, and 
that this transaction is the sale by the Seller to Buyer of 
unimproved acreage for such development purposes as the Buyer 
may elect to utilize the same. 
d. Seller hereby authorizes, empowers and instructs 
the Escrow Holder-Trustee, if requested by Buyer, to execute all 
documents reasonably necessary to subdivide, plat, and improve | 
the subject property or to annex said property or any portion 
thereof to an adjacent municipality or any water, sewer, or other 
improvement district as may be necessary or convenient, provided 
that nothing herein shall require the Escrow Holder-Trustee, or j 
Seller, to furnish any bonds or other obligation in connection 
with any such development, annexation, subdivision, or the 
installation of any improvements upon any of the subject property. 
5. Buyer hereby acknowledges that it has inspected 
the premises purchased hereunder, and that it is familiar with 
the locution, condition and terrain thereof; that said property 
is sold hereunder on an "as is" basis only. The Seller hereby j 
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations, 
express or implied, as to the state of the property, its con-
dition, quality, character, or suitability or fitness for any sue, 




6. Seller agrees tnat after receipt of the down payment 
Hereinabove provided for, that they will release lots to Buyer 
for all subsequent principal payments at tne rate of one lot for 
every prorata percentage of principal received from Buyer, said 
prorata percentage to oe determined by dividing the principal 
balance due DV the number of lots ODtamed in the subdivision. 
For example, if fifty (50) lots were obtained in the subdivision 
and the balance due was $335,880.00, Seller would release to 
Buyer one lot for every $6,717.60 of principal received (not 
counting the $75,000.00 down payment). ($335,880.00 divided 
Dy 50 equals $6,717.60.) 
7. Taxes shall be prorated as of the date of final 
contract of sale. Taxes after 1979 shall be paid by Buyer. 
8. Seller warrants that there are no liens or encum-
orances on the property hereinabove described and agrees to 
furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense a title policy showing 
good and marketable title in said property (said title policy to 
oe furnished at tne time of tne receipt of down payment from 
3uyer). Further, Seller agrees to execute and deliver to Buyer, 
or assigns, good and sufficient warranty aeeds covering t-tle to 
tne above described property when subdivided and as paid for in 
accordance with the terms hereinabove set out. 
9. In tne event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the 3uyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any 
payment or payments wnen the same shall become due, or within 
thirty (30) days tnereafter, tne Seller, at his option snail have 
the following alternative remedies: 
h 4 
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b. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment 
for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall 
not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of 
the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) 
or 
c. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, 
and upon written notice to tne Buyer, to declare the entire 
unpaid balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect 
to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to 
the 3uyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose 
the same in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and 
have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment 
of the balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; and 
the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may 
3 
-4-
remam. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upcn 
the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to tne 
appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged 
property and collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and 
apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or 
hold the same pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, 
upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the 
possession of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
10. It is agreed that time is the essence of this 
agreement. 
11. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances 
against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or m the event any liens or encumbrances other 
man herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against tne same 
by act.s or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his 
option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit on the 
amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such 
payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided 
to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer/ be suspended until 
such a time as such suspended payments shall equal any sums 
advanced as aforesaid. 
12. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, 
that the defaulting party shall pay ail costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby, or m pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah wnether such 
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
13. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid 
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement 
have hereunto signed their names, the day and year first above 
written. 
SCHEDULE A 
PARCEL 1 : ,_ 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter 
cf -ne Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence 
East 238 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerlme to a 
point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
Deginnmq at a point 763 feet Eastr of the Southwest corner of 
the Nortnwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more 
or less, to the centerlme of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly 
along said centerlme to a point North of beginning; thence 
South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.75 acres. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. 
Survey; running thence East 60.73 feet; thence Northeasterly 
to a point on the center of Combe Road, said point oeing East 
197.88 feet and North 0°04,30" West 571.02 feet to the center-
line of Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerlme 
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerlme of said road to 
a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place 
of beginning. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North 
835 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
Northwesterly along said centerlme to a point North of 
beginning; tnence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place 
jof beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
J PARCEL 5: 
.Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
• Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet, 
, more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North-
1
 westerly along the center of said County Road to a point 
North 835 feet, more or less, from tne point of beginning, 
thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 3.40 acres. 
cjyf 
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AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
This Amendment is made this £ V — day of November, 1982, 
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter 
designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON of Fullerton, California (hereinafter designated as 
"Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated 
December 29, 197 9 for the sale of property as described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by refer-
ence. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined m 
Paragraph 1 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for 
the first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on 
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31, 
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the 
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest 
in full." 
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and condi-
tions of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979 
shall remain the same and ir full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have 
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EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. 
By: S e c u r i t y T i t l e Company 
o f ChgAen a s Escrow 
H o W r - T r u s t e e 
( * PLAINTIFF'S j EXHIBIT 
BUYERS: 
/^PG-M&A 
CASPER J. BR5UER 
)/TJ£XAJL/X. 
This agreement is made this 3rd day cf January 19 81-, by 
and between Keith p. Combe and Evelyn Combe, his Wife, and First 
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated 
as "Sellers") and Casper J. Breuer and William M. Harrison of 
Fullerton, California (hereinafter Gesignated as "Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the terms of the Real Estate Contract 
dated December 29, 1979 for the sale property described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
This agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in 
Paragraph 1 of said contract as follows: 
For the period Dec. 31, 1981 to Dec. 31, 1982, Seller is 
owed $35,267.4 0 in interest. Seller agrees, for this period only, 
to accept a payment of $17,633.71 (one-half of the amount due) 
and to defer the payment of the balance, $17,633.71, until July 
1983. The deferred amount shall accrue interest at the rate of 
TEN AND ONE-HALF (10 1/2%) PERCENT per annum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have 
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KEITH P.COMBE 
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EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. 
By: S^ec-ardty T±t±c Company 
BUYERS 
CASPER Ji BREUER^, 
/ 
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AMEMESNT TO REAL ESTATE CDNTKAIT 
This Amendment is made this -y> ^ 'vday of February, 1934 by and 
between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter designated as "Sellers") 
and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON of Fullerton, California 
(hereinafter designated as "Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 
1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined in Paragraph 
#1 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyers shall pay to Sellers interest only for the 
first six (6) years of this Contract, payable on 
the 31st day of December, beginning on December 31, 
1980. On December 31, 1985, Sellers shall pay the 
balance of the purchase price, principal and interest 
in full. Seller does agree that when $120,000.00 or more 
is paid towards the principle during the contract period, 
that seller will extend the contract maturity date until 
December 31, 1988. Seller will accept the principle 
amount stated above in a lump sum payment or in aggre-
grate payments that will total that amount or more." 
Except for the above Amendment, all other terms and conditions of .the
 /? r/^ 
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Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979/shall remain'the same and ^ 
in full force and effect. /%{'* 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have hereunto 
signed their names on the day and year first-above written. 
SELLERS: 
EVELYN COMBE 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A. 
BUYERS^ ^ 
CASPER JiJ BREUER' 
tfilliAM M. IIP 
iM PLAINTIFFS 1 fiffT 1 
AMENDMENT TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
This Amendment is made this _* l:" day of February, 1984 
by and between KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN COMBE, his Wife, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee (hereinafter 
designated as "Sellers") and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON of Fullerton, California (hereinafter designated as 
"Buyers"). 
This Agreement amends the Real Estate Contract dated 
December 29, 1979 for the sale of property as described in Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
This Agreement amends the terms of the sale outlined 
in Paragraph #6 of said Contract as follows: 
"Buyer and Seller understand that a condominium 
developement is going to be constructed on the West 
15 acres of the property, i.e., the west portion of 
Skyline Drive. The development will contain 
approximately 90 condos to be constructed in 6 phases. 
The first phase will contain 14 units on approximately 
2V2 acres. The second phase will contain 12 units 
on approximately 2V2 acres. As each unit sells and closes 
the seller will receive $3732.00 principle payment. 
($335,880 - 90). Seller agrees to subordinate the 
initial 2V2 acres of ground needed in the first phase 
to a construction and development loan, the proceeds 
of which shall be strictly applied to improvements to 
the property. Seller may thereafter agree to 
subordinate additional parcels of ground upon such 




Except for the above Amendment, and
 < the Amendment dated * ^. 
~>i (j; day of February, 1984, all other terms and conditions ^' 
of the Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979, shall remain 
the same and in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties to this Amendment have 






^CASPER J. BRfitt£fc; 
, ///j/imi M/dmt77?/ 
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TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
TW Lawym' OrfBBixatto* It \mmt\mt Thk» |« fccal Erta* 
Denver, Colorado 
Issued By. 
Robert E. Froerer 
(Member's Name) 
536 24th Street, Suite 2B 
(Address) 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
OWNERS 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE 
B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, Attorneys' Title 
Guaranty Fund, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy 
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule 
A, and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, 
sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when 




ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND. INC. 
A<2> 
\ BY 
Fletcher Thomas. Secretary 
lilsEAL};) l/[Lvr^ HJ, J £ / R / ^ 
Wifford W Kirton. Jr.. President 
This policy must contain Schedules A and B 
duly validated by this signature: 
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TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
COVERAGE SAME AS A L T A OWNERS POLICY. FORM B 1970 AMENDED 10-17-70 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy 
1 Any law ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) 
restricting or regulating or prohibiting the occupancy use or enjoyment of the land or regulating the character, 
dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in 
ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law, 
ordinance or governmental regulation 
2 Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police powerunlessnoticeof the exercise of such rights ap-
pears in the public records at Date of Policy 
3 Defects liens encumbrances adverse claims or other matters (a) created suffered assumed or agreed to by 
the insured claimant (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the in-
sured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estale or interest insured by 
this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured 
claimant became an insured hereunder, (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant, (d) attaching 
or created subsequent to Date of Policy or (e) resultinq in loss or damage which would not have been sustained 
if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
Definition of Term* 
The following terms when used in th s policy mean 
(a) insured the insured named «r Schedule A and subiect to any rights or 
tenses the Company may have had against the named insured those who 
cceed to the interest of such nSured bv operation of law as distmqutshed from 
irchase mciudmq but not hrr ted to he rs distributees devisees sjrvivors 
rsonai representatives next of km or corporate or fiduciary successors 
lb) insured claimant an insured eta mmg loss or darraoe hereunoef 
<o knowledge actjai knowieooe not constructive fcnowiedoe or notice 
nch may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public records 
(d) land the land described specifically or by reference m Schedule A and 
provements affixed thereto which by Jaw constitute reai property provided 
>wever the term land does not include any property beyonc the lines of the 
ea specifically described or re^errea to in Schedule A nor any right title 
teres! estate or easement ir abutting sheets roads avenues alleys lanes ways 
waterways but no*hi no herein shai modify or limit the extent to which a right of 
cess to and I'om the land is insured by this policy 
(e) mortgage mortgage deed of trust trust deed or otne» security 
Strument 
(f) public records those records which by law impart constructive notice of 
atters relating to said land 
Continuation of Intursnce after Conveyance of Title 
Thecoveraoeof thispo icy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy m favor of 
i insured so tona assucn nsured ret a ns an estate or interest m the and or holds 
) indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser 
Dm such insured or so long as such insured shall have liability by reason of 
>venants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or conveyance of 
ich estate or interest provided howe/er this policy shall not continue in force in 
vor o* an/ purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the 
debtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured 
Defense and Prosecution of Actions — Notice of Claim to be Given by an 
Insured Claimant 
(ai The Company at its own cost and without undue delay shall provide for the 
»fense of an insured m all litigation consisting of actions or proceedings 
jmmenced agamst such insured to the extent that such litigation is founded 
Don an alleged defect hen encumbrance or other matter insured against by this 
Dlicy 
action or proceed 
come to an insure 
the title totheestc 
for which the Corr 
sha'i no' be Q**er 
Company sha I ce 
such prompt no' Cf 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) in case any 
• is beoun as set forth m |a) above (n) mease knowledge shall 
ereunoer of any claim of titie or interest which is adverse to 
'v interest as insured and which miQht cause loss or damage 
~y may be liable by virtue of this policy If such prompt notice 
- the Company then as to such insured all liability of the 
e and terminate m reqard to the maMer or matters for which 
s required provided however that fa jre to notify shaiim no 
case prejudice tne nqhts of any such insured unoer tn s policy unless the 
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the extent of such 
prejudice 
tc) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and without 
undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act which m its 
opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the titietothe estate or interest 
as insured and the Company may take any appropriate action under the terms of 
this policy whether or not it shall be liable thereunder and shall not thereby 
concede liability or waive any provision of this policy 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or interposed a 
defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this policy the Company 
may pursue any such litigation to tina. determination by a court of competent 
jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right in its sole discretion to appeal from 
any adverse judgment or order 
(e) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to prosecute 
or provide tor the defense of any action or proceeding the insured hereunder shall 
secure to the Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action 
or proceeding and at appeals therein and permit the Company to use at its 
option the name of such insured for such purpose Whenever requested by the 
Company such insured shall give the Company all reasonable aid in any such 
action or proceeding in effecting settlement securing evidence obtaining 
witnesses or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding and the 
Company shall reimburse such insured tor any expense so incurred 
4 Notice of Lot*—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3 (b) of these Conditions 
and Stipulations a statement in writing of any loss or damage for which it is 
claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall be furnished to the Company 
within 90 days after such loss or damage shall have been determined and no right 
of action shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such statement 
shall hjve been furnished Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage 
shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or 
damage 
Continued on cover sheet 
AMOUNT POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE DATE OF POLICY 
SCHEDULE A 
y 410,880.00 NAME OF INSURED November 14' 1 9 8 0 
The Equitable Estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract
 mt 8;24 
dated January 9, 1980, executed by KEITH P. COMBE, and EVELYN COMBE, 
his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee, as o'clock—h.—M. 
Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISON, as Buyer. 
Premium S 176?. SO 
3. The estate OT interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is: 
An i n t e r e s t pursuant t o t ha t ce r t a in Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, 
by and between KEITH P. CttBE and EVELYN, h i s wife, and FIRST SECURITY EANK N.A., Trustee, 
2 The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested inrjas Se l le r , and CASPER J , BREUER 
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Ccribe and Evelyn Ccrtibe j and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as 
Parcel #5: F i r s t Security Bank N.A., Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn. | Buyer, 
3. The land referred to in this Policy is situate in the County of WEBER ' 
State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A) 
countersigned: R o b e r t E . F r o e r e r 
Ogden, Weber County, Utah 
Issued at:. 
Autbon**d Officer or Agent 
policy oN°- 1 4 5 0 9 
THIS POLICY VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULE B IS ATTACHED 
ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
WAH (Owner's) 51C 
Coverage sarr>« B* 
ALTA Owner ' * Policy 
Form B 1970 Amended 10-17-70 S C H E D U L E B 
This policy does not insure against loss by reason of the following: 
PART ONE: This part of Schedule B refers to matters which, if any such exist, may affect the title to said land, but which 
are not shown in this policy: 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing agency or by the public rec-
ords, and casements, liens or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
2. Rights or claims of persons in possession of said land which arc not shown by the public records. 
3. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an 
inspection of said land, or by making inquiry ol persons in possession thereof, or by a correct survey. 
4. M nine claims, reservations in patents, water rights, claims or title to water. 
5. Proceedings for municipal improvement, which, at the date hereof, are shown by the official records of any such city, 
but have not resulted in the imposition of a lien upon, or establishment of an easement over, or adjudication of the 
right to a public use of said land or any part thereof. 
PART TV.'O This part of Schedule B shows liens, encumbianccs. defects and other matters affecting the title to said land 
D: to \shich SUJU title is subject: 
Taxes for year 1980 are a lien, not yet due. Tax I.D. numbers: #1, 07-086-0033; 
#2, 07-086-0039; #3, 07-086-0040; #4, 07-086-0034; #5, 07-086-0016. 
Property is subject to easements to the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
as described by document recorded in Book 1267, page 281 in the records? of Vfeber County. 
Property is within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and the 
Unitah Highlands Sewer Improvement District, and is subject to any and all assessments 
levied by said districts. 
Unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, by and between KEITH P. COMBE 
and EVELYN COMBE, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and 
CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM M. HARRISON, as Buyer. 
The Company shall assume no liability under this policy to the extent that loss or 
damage arises fran failure to record the instalment or instruments necessary to 
evidence the estate or interest covered by this policy. 
Right of Trustee or Receiver in the even of bankruptcy, receivership or insolvency 
of the Seller to repudiate the Contract. 
This policy does not insure or guarantee performance by the Seller, his heirs, 
successors and assigns, under the Terms of the Contract. 
Property taxes for 1978 and 1979 are a lien on Parcel #1 and Parcel #4. Amount due 
on Parcel #1: $581.30 for 1978, $552.59 for 1979. Arcount due on Parcel #4: $581.30 
1978 and $552.59 for 1979. 
:ountcrsigncd: Robert E. Froerer 
Aut&onzed Officer or Agent 
POLICY SERIAL NO. O- 14509 
The typed serial number above MUST be the same 
as the printed serial number on Schedule A. 
SCHEDULE A 
PARCEL 1: 
bcgTnnTng at the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence 
I East 238 feet, thence North 900 feet, more or less, to the center 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a 
[J point North of beginning, thence South 930 feet, more or less, 
I to the place of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
P beg inning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest corner of 
I the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Running thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, more 
I or less, to the centerline of Combe Road; thence Northwesterly 
along said centerline to a point North of beginning; thence 
| South 750 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2.75 acres. 
If 
I P A R C E L 3: 
I b e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t 9 3 7 . 3 6 feet East of the S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r 
I of the N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of the N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 
I 23, T o w n s h i p 5 N o r t h , R a n g e 1 W e s t , Salt Lake M e r i d i a n , U . S . 
j. S u r v e y ; r u n n i n g t h e n c e E a s t 60.73 feet; t h e n c e N o r t h e a s t e r l y 
| to a point on the c e n t e r of Combe Road, said p o i n t b e i n g East 
j; 197.88 feet and N o r t h O # O 4 f 3 0 ' W e s t 5 7 1 . 0 2 feet to the c e n t e r -
j line of C o m b e Road and N o r t h w e s t e r l y along said c e n t e r l i n e 
li 15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of said road to 
li a point North of beginning; thence South 625 feet to the place 
I] of beg inning . 
I ^ApCEL <: 
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
I 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
li U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North 
•| 835 feet, more or less, to tho center of Combe Road, thence 
v Northwesterly along said centerline to a point North of 
j  beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place 
I of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
II PARCEL 5: 
I beginning 498 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
.Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
;Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
jand running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet, 
: more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North-
jwesterly along the center of said County Road to a point 
''North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning, 
! thence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—CONTINUED 
pttoni to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
ie Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle tor or m the name 
insured claimant any claim insured agamst or to terminate all liability and 
ations ot the Company hereunder by paying or tendering payment ot the 
mt of insurance under this policy together withany costs attorneys feesand 
^ses incurred up to the t me Of Sucn payment or tender of payment by the 
?d claimant and authorized by the Company 
termination and Payment of Lots 
>e hab iity of the Company unoer this policy shall in nocaseexceed the least 
tne actual loss of the insured claimant or 
tre amount o' insurance stated in Schedule A 
he Company wilt pay in addition to any loss insured agamst by this policy a!' 
•mposec upon an insured m litigation earned on by the Company for such 
>C and an costs attorneys fees ana expenses in litigation earned on by such 
»0 with the written authorization of the Company 
'hen i ability has been definitely fixed in accordance with the conditions of 
oiicy the loss or damage shall be payable withm 30 days thereafter 
station of Liability 
a ~ s*~a ar sr o 'DF ma nta rar * nac tn.s poi«cv ia>'tthe Company atte' 
3 received notice of an alleged defect i»en or encumbrance insured agamst 
r.der by I'tiaation or otherwise removes such detect hen or encumbrance 
at s^es me t *ie as msjred * *n r a reasonable time atter receipt of such 
(b) m me even* of litigation until there has been a final determination by a 
D* competent )uf sdict on and 0 sposition of all appeals therelrorr adverse 
tttie as insurer as provided m paragraph 3 hereof or (c) for liability 
amy assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit without prior written 
nt of the Company 
uction of Liability 
payments under this policy except payments made tor costs attorneys 
TO expenses shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro tanto No 
nt shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of such 
nt un.ess the policy be lost or destroyed in which case proof of such loss or 
:t.on shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company 
>lllty Noncumulativt 
expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall 
uced by anv amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring either 
longage shown or referred to in Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the 
or m'erest covered by this policy or (b) a mortgage hereafter executed by 
jred which is a charge or lien on the estate or interest described or referred 
ched j ie A and the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this 
The Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such 
iges any amount that otherwise would be payable hereunderto the insured 
of the estate or interest covered by this policy and the amount sopaid shall 
be deemed a payment under this policy to said insured owner 
10 Apportionment 2 
if the land described m Schedule A consists of two or more parcels which are 
not used as a single site and a loss is established affecting one or more of said 
parcels but not an the loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basts as if 
the amount of insurance under this policy was divided pro rata as to the va ue 
on Date of Pohcv o4 each separate parcel to the who'e exclusive of any irn 
provements made subseauent to Date of Policy unless a lability or value has 
otherwise been agreed upon as to each such parcel by the Company and the 
insured at the time of the issuance of this policy and shown by an express 
statement herein or by an endorsement attached hereto 
11 Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shai' have settled a claim under this policy all right of 
subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured 
claimant The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights ano 
remedies which such insured claimant would have had agamst any person or 
property in respect to such claim had this policy not been issued and if requested 
by the Company such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights 
and remedies agamst any person or property necessary in order to perfect such 
right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the name of such 
insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such nghtsor remedies 
It the payment does not co*er the loss of such insured claimant the Company 
shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies in the proportion which sa.d 
payment bears to the amount of said loss If loss should result t-om any act of such 
insured claimant such act shall not void this policy but the Company in that 
event shall be required to pay only that pan of any losses insured agamst 
hereunder which shall exceed the amount if any lost to the Company by reason of 
the impairment of the right of subrogation 
12 Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments if any 
attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract between the 
insured and the Company 
Any claim of loss or damage whether or not based on negligence and which 
arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any 
action asserting such claim shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions 
and stipulations of this policy 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President a Vice 
President the Secretary and Assistant Secretary or validating officer or 
authorized signatory of the Company 
13. Notices. Where Sent 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in writing 
required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to its Home Office 
THIS POLICY IS NOT TRANSFERABLE TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS A REISSUE POLICY IN FAVOR OF NEW PURCHASERS SHOULD BE OBTAINED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 'SifAttfeftQ&a 
BRUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs. 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
Trustee, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTIONS 
Case No. 90135 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 




CASPER J. BREUER and 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 90793 
The parties entered into a Real Estate Contract, 
Paragraph 8 of which states, "Seller warrants that there are no 
liens or encumbrances on the property herein above described, and 
agrees to furnish to Buyer, at Sellers expense, a title policy 
showing good and marketable title in said property (said title 
policy to be furnished at the time of the receipt of down payment 
Page 2 
Ruling on Motions 
Case No. 90135 
from Buyer). Furtherf Seller agrees to execute and deliver to 
Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient warranty deeds covering 
title to the above described property when subdivided and as paid 
for in accordance with the terms hereinabove set out."1 
(In regard to the sellers claim that Paragraph 5 makes 
it an "as is" sale, without warranties, I hold that Paragraph 5 
is speaking of the physical condition of the property, and has 
nothing to do with the warranties of title as set out Paragraph 
8.) The original contract was dated January 9, 1980. It was 
amended four times, but at no time was Paragraph 8 altered and 
the amendments stated and all other terms and conditions shall 
remain the same. 
It turns out that there is a 30 foot wide easement 
traversing the property diagonally in a northwest direction and 
in the easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size. 
The easement is not listed in the Real Estate Contract as an 
exception to Paragraph 8. 
There is argument between the parties as to when the 
buyers knew of the easement; sellers claiming they knew all along 
and buyers claiming they knew sometime in 1983. The buyers claim 
that the sellers committed an anticipatory breach of contract, in 
that they are now and will always be unable to supply a warranty 
deed free of the easement. The sellers make no claim that they 
can relieve the property of the easement by having the pipeline 
A ^^ 
Page 3 
Ruling on Motions 
Case No. 90135 
changed. Admittedlyf they cannot comply with Paragraph 8 of 
their contract. I find that the doctrine of anticipatory breach 
is applicable in this casef as the sellers are unable to perform 
their obligation under the contract to convey fee simple, 
unencumbered title to the buyers. I further find that the 
easement is not a minor inconvenience, but is a substantial 
encumbrance to fee title. 
I further find that waiver is not a defense to their 
inability to perform. 
There are various remedies for anticipatory breach, and 
the buyer is not required to immediately make an election or be 
held to waive his right to rescind the contract. The purchaser 
is entitled to a deed which conveys the fee simple title to the 
land without the easement and is not required to accept a defec-
tive title. The Glasmann case cited by both parties, which has 
stood for 80 years, rather hits the nail on the head, wherein it 
states, "The respondent contracted to furnish a good title, and 
the fact that he was unable to do so is his misfortune, and not 
the fault of the appellant." 
The contract being subject to rescission, the buyer may 
be entitled to some refund of payments. If the parties cannot 
arrive at an agreement between themselves, they are instructed to 




Ruling on Motions 
Case No. 90135 
The buyers1 motion for summary judgment seeking 
rescission is granted. 
Whereas the ruling granting summary judgment for 
rescission ends the contract between the parties, the sellers 
action for foreclosure falls of its own weight. The buyers1 
motion for summary judgment dismissing the sellers complaint for 
foreclosure is granted. 
The buyers1 counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and 
judgment in accordance herewith. 
DATED this l rf day of March, 1986. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I 1 day of March, 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions was 
served upon the following: 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
Attorney for Bruer-Harrison 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney for Defendants Combe 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ann 
James Z. Davis 
Attorney for Defendant First Security Bank 
1020 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David C. West 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Jeffry R. Burton 
2606 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
JwsJ? 
PAULA CARRf Secretary 
TabF 
Jack L. Schoenhals #2881 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 363-8823 
U'Tsr-* /-V. :: .\ L ^
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 




KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 90135 
\ 
# 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 




CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 90793 
The above-en t i t l ed matter came on regular ly for hearing 
b e f o r e t h e Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of 
n 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t , i n h i s cou r t room on t h e 19 th day 
of D e c e m b e r , 1985 , a t t h e hour of 2:00 p . m . , t h e P l a i n t i f f s , 
B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , C a s p e r J . B r e u e r a n d Wi l l i am M. 
H a r r i s o n , w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by J a c k L. S c h o e n h a l s , t h e 
D e f e n d a n t s , K e i t h P . C o m b e a n d E v e l y n C o m b e , w e r e 
r e p r e s e n t e d by J o h n A s h t o n , t h e D e f e n d a n t , R o b e r t E. 
F r o e r e r , was no t p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Defendan t T i t l e 
G u a r a n t y F u n d was r e p r e s e n t e d by D a v i d W e s t , a n d t h e 
D e f e n d a n t F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was r e p r e s e n t e d by James Z. 
D a v i s , t h e C o u r t h a v i n g r ev iewed t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s i n 
t h i s m a t t e r and hav ing hea rd argument of c o u n s e l and hav ing 
M e m o r a n d u m s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Cour t and hav ing r ev i ewed t h e 
s a m e and hav ing e n t e r e d i t s R u l i n g on M o t i o n s , now makes and 
e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . C a s p e r J . B r e u e r a n d W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n , a s 
b u y e r s ; and K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and F i r s t S e c u r i t y 
B a n k , N . A . , T r u s t e e , a s s e l l e r s , e n t e r e d i n t o a r e a l e s t a t e 
c o n t r a c t d a t e d J a n u a r y 9, 1980 . 
2 . P u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , 
t h e b u y e r s made a down payment of $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
3 . Art—fche-tiTme of t h e p u r c h a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e 
ex-e-e-trtrrrnT~bf t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , t h e s e l l e r s p a i d f o r 
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a p o l i c y of t i t l e i n su rance , which was issued to the buyers 
as i n s u r e d s . 
4 . The b u y e r s and t h e s e l l e r s e n t e r e d i n t o f o u r 
amendmen t s t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t which a l t e r e d the 
t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of the payments due under the terms of 
the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
5 . Even t h o u g h t h e b u y e r s and s e l l e r s en te red i n t o 
amendmen t s t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , a t no time was 
p a r a g r a p h 8 of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t a l t e r e d and the 
a m e n d m e n t s p r o v i d e d t h a t " . . . a l l o t h e r t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t dated December 29, 
1979 s h a l l remain the same and in f u l l force and e f f e c t . " 
6. The r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e s the s e l l e r s to 
e x e c u t e and d e l i v e r t o t h e b u y e r s or a s s i g n s , good and 
s u f f i c i e n t warranty deeds covering t i t l e of the p r o p e r t y . 
7 . T h e r e i s a 30 f o o t wide easement which t r a v e r s e s 
t h e p r o p e r t y d i agona l ly in a northwest d i r e c t i o n and wi th in 
t h a t easement i s an i r r i g a t i o n aquaduct of s u b s t a n t i a l s i z e . 
8. The easement and the aquaduct are n e i t h e r desc r ibed 
i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t nor are they excepted from the 
o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e s e l l e r s t o convey good and s u f f i c i e n t 
warranty deeds f ree and c l e a r of l i e n s and encumbrances. 
- 3 -
9. The e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct were 
n o t d i s c l o s e d by t h e s e l l e r s t o the buyers , were not noted 
i n t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t , or shown as an except ion in the 
po l i cy of t i t l e insurance i ssued to the buyers . 
1 0 . I n t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e y e a r 1 9 8 3 , Combes 
d i s c l o s e d the e x i s t e n c e of the easement to the buyers 1 agent 
a t which t i m e a new t i t l e r e p o r t was p r e s e n t e d t o the 
buyers 1 agent which d i s c l o s e d the e x i s t e n c e of the easement. 
1 1 . There i s a d i spu t e of f ac t as to the exact da te at 
which t h e b u y e r s became aware of t h e e x i s t e n c e of the 
easement and became aware of the e x i s t e n c e of the aquaduct . 
1 2 . Paragraph 5 of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t con ta in ing 
t h e p h r a s e "as i s " p e r t a i n s to the phys i ca l cond i t i on of the 
p r o p e r t y and has nothing to do with the w a r r a n t i e s of t i t l e 
wh ich a r e d e a l t w i t h s e p a r a t e l y in paragraph 8 of the r e a l 
e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 3 . The s e l l e r s have made no c l a i m t h a t t h e y can 
r e l i e v e t h e p r o p e r t y of the easement and/or t h a t they can 
have the p i p e l i n e removed from the p r o p e r t y . 
1 4 . The s e l l e r s cannot comply with paragraph 8 of the 
r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and c a n n o t convey t i t l e to the r e a l 
p rope r ty f r ee and c l e a r of the easement and the aquaduct . 
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1 5 . The e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct i s 
n o t a minor i n c o n v e n i e n c e bu t i s i n s t e a d a s u b s t a n t i a l 
encumbrance to the fee t i t l e to the p r o p e r t y . 
1 6 . The s e l l e r s were not ob l i ga t ed to convey t i t l e to 
t h e b u y e r s u n t i l the buyers made payment of the balance due 
in f u l l to the s e l l e r s . 
1 7 . At no t i m e , up t o and inc lud ing the date of the 
h e a r i n g of t h i s m o t i o n , d i d t h e buyers tender the e n t i r e 
b a l a n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t and demand conveyance of the fee 
simple t i t l e . 
1 8 . The s e l l e r s , because they cannot comply with the 
t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and convey unencumbered 
f e e t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y , a r e g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y 
breach of the c o n t r a c t . 
1 9 . S i n c e t h e s e l l e r s cannot perform t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n 
u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e R e a l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t and cannot 
c o n v e y f e e t i t l e , by w a r r a n t y deed, f ree and c l e a r of the 
e a s e m e n t and a q u a d u c t , t h e b u y e r s a r e r e l i e v e d of any 
f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n t o perform under the terms of the r e a l 
e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
2 0 . T h e r e i s no c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of the buyers 
w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b u y e r s e l e c t e d t o t r e a t t h e 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h as a breach of the c o n t r a c t u n t i l the 
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b u y e r s f i l e d l e g a l ac t ion and a l l eged t h a t the s e l l e r s were 
g u i l t y of an a n t i c i p a t o r y breach . 
2 1 . The b u y e r s made a s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t , over a 
s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d of t i m e , to see if they could m i t i g a t e 
t h e i r damages and/or m i t i g a t e the impact of the easement and 
t h e a q u a d u c t upon t h e p r o p e r t y , and in t h i s r ega rd , they 
h i r e d the s e r v i c e s of va r ious eng ineers and examined s eve ra l 
a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s of developing the p rope r ty around the 
easement and the aquaduct . 
2 2 . The buyers became aware, t h a t t he e x i s t e n c e of the 
e a s e m e n t and t h e a q u a d u c t i n t e r f e r e d with t h e i r proposed 
development of the p r o p e r t y . 
2 3 . The easement was not shown on any ske tches or p l a t 
m a p s g i v e n t o t h e b u y e r s p r i o r t o t h e t i m e t h a t t h e y 
purchased the p r o p e r t y . 
2 4 . The f i r s t t i m e t h e e a s e m e n t was shown on any 
d r a w i n g s p r e p a r e d by Great Basin Engineering was a f t e r the 
new t i t l e r e p o r t was g i v e n by the s e l l e r s t o the buyers 1 
agent in 1983. 
2 5 . The r e a l p r o p e r t y r e m a i n s in the same p h y s i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n as i t was when the o r i g i n a l r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t 
was executed between the buyers and the s e l l e r s . 
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2 6 . The b u y e r s made a t i m e l y e l e c t i o n to claim an 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h of the c o n t r a c t , and/or to r e sc ind the 
c o n t r a c t . Af te r the buyers made t h e i r e l e c t i o n to claim an 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h a n d / o r t o r e s c i n d t h e c o n t r a c t , by 
f i l i n g l e g a l a c t i o n , t h e r e i s no evidence t h a t the buyers 
e n g a g e d in any c o n d u c t which could c o n s t i t u t e a waiver of 
t h e i r r i g h t t o e l e c t t o a c t upon the a n t i c i p a t o r y breach 
and/or to r e sc ind the c o n t r a c t . 
2 7 . The q u e s t i o n of t h e r e f u n d t o be p a i d by t h e 
s e l l e r s t o t h e b u y e r s i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . I f t h e p a r t i e s 
c a n n o t a r r i v e a t an agreement between t h e m s e l v e s as t o t h e 
a m o u n t t o be r e f u n d e d , t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e amount of t h e 
r e f u n d w i l l h a v e t o be r e s e r v e d f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n a t a 
f u t u r e d a t e a f t e r an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
The c o u r t h a v i n g made and e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s of F a c t 
now makes and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The sellers are unable to perform under the terms 
of the real estate contract and convey unencumbered fee 
simple title to the buyers. 
2. The easement and the aquaduct contained within the 
easement constitute a substantial encumbrance to fee title. 
-7-
3 . The b u y e r s are rel ieved of any further obl igat ions 
under the t e rms of t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t and/or are 
en t i t l ed to a rescis ion of the rea l e s t a t e cont rac t . 
4. The buyers did not waive the i r r ight to require the 
s e l l e r s to per form under the t e rms of t h e r e a l e s t a t e 
cont rac t . 
5. Waiver of t he r i g h t of the buyers to require the 
s e l l e r s t o per form and/or to rescind the contract i s not a 
d e f e n s e to the s e l l e r s 1 i n a b i l i t y to perform under the facts 
of t h i s case. 
6. Af te r t h e buye r s elected to act upon the s e l l e r s 1 
a n t i c i p a t o r y b r each of t h e c o n t r a c t and to seek to be 
r e l i e v e d of the obl igat ion of further performance under the 
t e rms of t h e c o n t r a c t a n d / o r t o rescind the con t rac t , by 
f i l i n g l e g a l ac t ion , there is no evidence of any conduct on 
t h e p a r t of t he b u y e r s which would cons t i tu te a waiver of 
t h e i r r i g h t t o r e q u i r e t h e s e l l e r s t o perform, or to be 
r e l i e v e d of f u r t h e r obl igat ion under the terms of the rea l 
e s t a t e contract and/or to rescind the cont rac t . 
7. The buyers are en t i t l ed to a deed which conveys fee 
s imple unencumbered t i t l e to the land without the easement 
and t h e aquaduc t and the buyers are not required to accept 
defect ive t i t l e . 
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8 . The r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e s the s e l l e r s to 
c o n v e y f e e s i m p l e , u n e n c u m b e r e d t i t l e which t i t l e 
d e m o n s t r a t e s good and marke tab le t i t l e , f ree and c l e a r of 
the e x i s t e n c e of the easement and the aquaduct . 
9 . The amendments e n t e r e d i n t o by and between the 
p a r t i e s do no t r e l i e v e t h e s e l l e r s of the o b l i g a t i o n to 
convey fee simple unencumbered t i t l e to the buyers . 
10 . The "as i s " p r o v i s i o n s contained in paragraph 5 of 
t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t r e l a t e to the phys ica l cond i t ion of 
t h e p r o p e r t y and have nothing to do with wa r r an t i e s of t i t l e 
as se t fo r th in paragraph 8 of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 1 . The s e l l e r s have made no c l a i m t h a t t h e y can 
r e l i e v e t h e p roper ty of the easement by having the easement 
and the p i p e l i n e changed or removed. 
1 2 . The d o c t r i n e of a n t i c i p a t o r y breach i s a p p l i c a b l e 
in t h i s c a s e and t h e s e l l e r s a r e unable to perform t h e i r 
o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t t o convey f e e s i m p l e 
unencumbered t i t l e to the buyers . 
1 3 . The b u y e r s had s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e r e m e d i e s 
a v a i l a b l e a r i s i n g o u t of t h e a n t i c i p a t o r y breach of the 
c o n t r a c t by t h e s e l l e r s . The buyers "were not r equ i red to 
i m m e d i a t e l y make an e l e c t i o n to ac t upon the a n t i c i p a t o r y 
b r e a c h of the c o n t r a c t , or to seek to be r e l i e v e d of fu r the r 
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o b l i g a t i o n t o p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t , 
a n d / o r t o r e s c i n d the c o n t r a c t or t h e r e f o r e be held to have 
waived t h e i r r i g h t t o so a c t . 
1 4 . The Gla s sman c a s e c i t e d by t h e buyers and the 
s e l l e r s " h i t s the n a i l on the head", wherein i t s t a t e s , " the 
r e s p o n d e n t c o n t r a c t e d to furn ish a good t i t l e , and the f ac t 
t h a t he was u n a b l e t o do so i s h i s mi s fo r tune , and not the 
f a u l t of the a p p e l l a n t . " 
15. The c o n t r a c t i s sub jec t to r e s c i s i o n . 
1 6 . The b u y e r s may be e n t i t l e d to some refund of the 
p a y m e n t s m a d e . I f t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t e n t e r i n t o an 
a g r e e m e n t as to the refund to be made, t he p a r t i e s are to be 
d i r e c t e d t o r e q u e s t a d a t e f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y hear ing so 
t h a t the mat ter can be r e s o l v e d . 
1 7 . A p a r t i a l summary judgment should be granted to 
t h e b u y e r s d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e s e l l e r s a r e u n a b l e to 
p e r f o r m u n d e r the terms of the c o n t r a c t , the buyers are not 
o b l i g a t e d t o f u r t h e r p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e 
c o n t r a c t , and/or the buyers are e n t i t l e d to r e s c i s i o n of t h e 
r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
1 8 . The f ac t t h a t t he buyers are e n t i t l e d to a summary 
j u d g m e n t d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the s e l l e r s a re unable to perform 
u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e b u y e r s a r e no t 
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o b l i g a t e d t o f u r t h e r p e r f o r m u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e 
c o n t r a c t , a n d / o r are e n t i t l e d to r e s c i s i o n of the c o n t r a c t , 
e n d s t h e c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s , and the s e l l e r s ' 
a c t ion for fo rec losu re f a l l s of i t s own weight . 
1 9 . A summary j u d g m e n t should be en te red d i smiss ing 
the s e l l e r s 1 complaint for f o r e c l o s u r e . 
2 0 . A p a r t i a l s u m m a r y judgment s h o u l d be e n t e r e d by 
t h e c o u r t i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t i n t o t h e 
p a r t i a l summary judgment . 
Dated t h i s £_ day of A p r i l ^; 1986. 
COURT: 
RONAL LD 0 . HYDE, ^JUDdE 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 




KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT A. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, AND 




Civil No. 90135 r * \ 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 




CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Civil No. 90793 
Defendants. 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d mat ter came on r e g u l a r l y for hear ing 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald 0. Hyde, one of t he Judges of 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Cour t , in h i s courtroom on the 19th day 
of D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , a t t h e hour of 2:00 o ' c l o c k , p .m. , the 
P l a i n t i f f s , B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and 
W i l l i a m M. Har r i son , were r ep re sen t ed by Jack L. Schoenhals , 
t h e D e f e n d a n t s , K e i t h P. Combe and E v e l y n Combe, were 
r e p r e s e n t e d by John A s h t o n , t h e D e f e n d a n t , R o b e r t E. 
F r o e r e r , was not p r e s e n t or r e p r e s e n t e d , the Defendant T i t l e 
G u a r a n t y Fund was r e p r e s e n t e d by Dav id W e s t , and t h e 
D e f e n d a n t F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was r ep re sen t ed by James Z. 
D a v i s , t h e C o u r t h a v i n g reviewed the f i l e s and records in 
t h i s m a t t e r and having heard argument of counsel and having 
Memorandums s u b m i t t e d to the Court and having reviewed the 
same and having en te red i t s Ruling on Motions, now mctkes and 
e n t e r s the fo l lowing : 
IT I S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . The P l a i n t i f f s , B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . 
B r e u e r and William M. H a r r i s o n ' s Motion for Summary Judgment 
b e a n d t h e s a m e i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d and i t i s h e r e b y 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s e l l e r s Kei th P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, 
and t h e F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank are unable t o perform under the 
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t e r m s of t h e r e a l e s t a t e con t r ac t and a re unable t o convey 
u n e n c u m b e r e d fee simple t i t l e to the buyers . I t i s f u r the r 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e b u y e r s a r e r e l i e v e d of any fu r the r 
o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e t e r m s of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t . 
T h e e f f e c t of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t i s t o g r a n t 
P l a i n t i f f s a r e s c i s s i o n of the r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t en te red 
i n t o by and between the sa id P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants . 
2 . K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t Secur i ty 
Bank , N.A., Ogden Utah, as Trus tee for P h i l i p Combe's Motion 
f o r Summary Judgment a g a i n s t Casper J . Breuer and William M. 
Har r i son , be and the same i s hereby denied . 
3 . B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . Breuer and William 
M. H a r r i s o n may be e n t i t l e d t o some refund of payments made 
t o K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and The F i r s t Secur i ty Bank, 
N . A . , Ogden U t a h , as T r u s t e e for P h i l i p Combe. As t o The 
F i r s t Secur i ty Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as Trus tee for P h i l i p 
Combe, t h e l i a b i l i t y may be l i m i t e d as provided in the Utah 
Code A n n o t a t e d 7 5 - 7 - 3 0 6 . If the p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t 
an a g r e e m e n t among t h e m s e l v e s as t o the refund, they are 
i n s t r u c t e d to con tac t t he ca lendar c l e r k and have t h e mat ter 
se t for an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . 
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Dated this 4? day of Ap£i:& 1986. 
BY T#£"")COURT: 
)tfALD 0 . HYDE, JUDGE T RDI 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to 
the following this •£>?v— day of April, 1986. 
John P. Ashton 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorneys at Law 
Third Floor Mony Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Z. Davis 
Attorney at Law 
1020 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David C. West 
Attorney at Law 
1300 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce Maak 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 1300, 185 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffry R. Burton 
Attorney at Law 
2606 Washington Blvd. 





Jack L. Schoenhals ^-.^V^'V' 
Attorney for Breuer-Har^(go iria 
721 Kearns Bui lding 
Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84101 
Telephone No. 363-8823 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 
J. BREUER and WILLIAM M. 
HARRISON, 
Plaintiffs, 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, and 




ORDER AMENDING FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Civil No. 090135 
\ 
• \ 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee 
for Philip Combe, 
Plaintiffs, 
CASPER J. BREUER AND 
WILLIAM M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
Civ i l No. 90793 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d mat ter came on r e g u l a r l y for hear ing 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t , i n h i s cour t room, Ogden C i ty , ^S? 
W * 
~ ^ 9 
"T31 
973 
W e b e r C o u n t y M u n i c i p a l B u i l d i n g , on J u l y 10 , 1986 , a t t h e 
h o u r of 9:00 a . m . , on O b j e c t i o n s t o t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law f i l e d by K e i t h P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, 
R o b e r t E. F r o e r e r , A t t o r n e y s T i t l e G u a r a n t y Funding and 
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank, N.A. ; B r e u e r - H a r r i s o n , I n c . , Casper J . 
B r e u e r a n d W i l l i a m M. H a r r i s o n were r e p r e s e n t e d by J a c k L. 
S c h o e n h a l s , K e i t h P. Combe and Eve len Combe were r e p r e s e n t e d 
by J o h n P . A s h t o n , R o b e r t E. F r o e r e r was r e p r e s e n t e d by 
T h e o d o r e E. K a n e l l , T i t l e Gua ran ty Funding was r e p r e s e n t e d 
by D a v i d W e s t , F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank was n e i t h e r p r e s e n t nor 
r e p r e s e n t e d , t h e Cour t hav ing r e v i e w e d t h e f i l e s and r e c o r d s 
i n t h i s c a s e and hav ing h e a r d argument of c o u n s e l , now makes 
and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as f o l l o w s : 
1 . The f o l l o w i n g numbered p a r a g r a p h s of t h e F i n d i n g s 
of F a c t d a t e d May 6 , 1 9 8 6 , a r e h e r e b y amended t o r e a d as 
f o l l o w s : 
3 . The S e l l e r s p a i d f o r a p o l i c y of t i t l e 
i n s u r a n c e , w h i c h was i s s u e d t o t h e B u y e r s a s 
i n s u r e d s . 
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4. The Buyers and Sel lers entered into four 
amendments t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t which 
a l t e r e d t h e te rms and conditions of the payments 
due under t h e t e rms of the real e s t a t e cont rac t . 
The da te s the four amendments were executed are as 
follows: 1 1 / 2 4 / 8 2 ; 1 / 3 / 8 3 ; and two amendments 
were executed on 2/26/84. 
9. P r i o r t o the year 1983, the existence of 
t h e easement and the aquaduct were not disclosed 
by t h e S e l l e r s to t h e Buyers, were not noted in 
t h e r e a l e s t a t e cont rac t , or shown as an exception 
on t h e p o l i c y of t i t l e i n s u r a n c e issued to the 
Buyers. 
12 . P a r a g r a p h 12 of the Findings of Fact is 
he reby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
he reby adop ted by t h e Court as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
16, P a r a g r a p h 16 of the Findings of Fact is 
he reby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
hereby adop ted by t h e Court as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
18 . P a r a g r a p h 18 of the Findings of Fact is 
he reby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
hereby adop ted by t h e Court as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
19. P a r a g r a p h 19 of the Findings of Fact is 
he reby determined to be a Conclusion of Law and is 
hereby adop ted by t h e Cour t as a Conclusion of 
Law. 
2 1 . The Buyers made a s u b s t a n t i a l e f fo r t , 
over a s u b s t a n t i a l period of time, to see if they 
cou ld m i t i g a t e t h e i r damages and/or mit igate the 
impact of t h e easement and the aquaduct upon the 
p r o p e r t y , and in t h i s r e g a r d , t hey h i r e d the 
s e r v i c e s of various engineers and examined several 
a l t e r n a t i v e methods of deve lop ing the property 
around t h e easement and the aquaduct pr ior to the 
t i m e t h a t t h e y f i l e d l e g a l a c t i o n and were 
{ •? " ) / • > ; 
^:^z:'-L,.o\: ±0.0 
-* 9.31 ; 
i 
j u s t i f i e d in d e l a y i n g the f i l i n g of l e g a l a c t i o n 
u n t i l they made t h a t e f f o r t . 
2 7 . The q u e s t i o n of the refund, i f any, t o 
be p a i d by t h e S e l l e r s t o t h e B u y e r s , i s a 
q u e s t i o n of f a c t . If the p a r t i e s cannot a r r i v e a t 
an a g r e e m e n t be tween themselves as t o the amount 
t o be r e f u n d e d , the ques t ion of the amount of the 
r e f u n d , i f a n y , w i l l have t o be rese rved for a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n a t a f u t u r e d a t e a f t e r an 
e v i d e n t i a r y hea r ing . 
2 . T h e f o l l o w i n g n u m b e r e d p a r a g r a p h s of t h e 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law dated May 6, 1986, a re hereby amended to 
read as fo l lows : 
1 1 . P a r a g r a p h 11 of the Conclusions of Law 
i s h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d to be a Finding of Fact and 
i s h e r e b y a d o p t e d by t h e C o u r t as a Finding of 
F a c t . 
3 . E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d h e r e i n by t h i s Order, which 
m o d i f i e s and amends the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
L a w , a l l o t h e r O b j e c t i o n s made by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e 
- 5 -
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, except as granted 
herein, are hereby overruled and denied. 
Dated this 5 0 day of July, 1986. 
BY TEE-'CQURT: 
)TO^/^ . 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order, 
John P. Ashton, Er ik S t r i n d b e r g , Attorneys at Law, Third 
Floor MONY Plaza, 424 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
8 4111; James Z. Davis, Attorney at Law, 1020 Fi rs t Security 
Bank B l d g . , Ogden, Utah 84401; David C. West, Attorney at 
Law, 1300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Bruce 
Maak, At to rney a t Law, Suite 1300, 185 S. Sta te , Salt Lake 
C i t y , Utah 84111; and Theodore E. Kanell, Attorney at Law, 
650 Clark Learning B l d g . , Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, th is 
VV^~day of July, 1986.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC. , 
CASPER J . BREUER and 
WILLIAM HARRISON, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN 
COMBE,f ROBERT E. FROERER, 
and ATTORNEYS1 TITLE GUARANTY 
FUND, INC. , and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH, N. A. , TRUSTEE, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 90135 
Combes have f i l e d c ros s - c l a im a g a i n s t Defendants 
Attorneys1 T i t l e Guaranty Fund and Robert E. Froerer. The basic 
fac ts of the cross-claim are that Froerer was contacted by real 
e s ta te agent Steve Keil in the summer of 1979 to a s s i s t in the 
sale and t ransfer of such proper t ies as owned by Combes. Froerer 
prepared the agreements, which were used in the sale of the 
property to Breuer and Harrison, including the Real Estate 
Contract, which became the sales agreement between Combe and 
Breuer-Harrison. The Real Estate Contract s t a t e s that the se l l e r 
warrants t i t l e and wi l l pay for t i t l e policy. The real es ta te 
agreements were gone over by Combe's a t torney, Paul Kunz, prior 
87 8 
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to closing. The closing documents apparently were prepared by 
Froerer, but he did not handle the closing. The contract between 
Combe and Breuer-Ear rison was entered into December z9, 1979. 
Funds for title policy were paid to Froerer, but the policy was 
not issued until November, 1980. No prelimary title report was 
requested, none was done, and the contract was entered into 
between Breuer-Karrison and Combe without the benefit of a title 
search. Combes1 claim damages against Froerer for breach of duty 
by failing to conduct a title search in a reasonable and diligent 
manner so as to detect the pipeline, and by drafting a real 
estate contract to warrant title, and claim relief against 
Froerer and Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund under the title policy 
which failed to accept the pipeline. Under the pleadings 
themselves, it is difficult to tell just what the claim against 
Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund is other than it states, based 
upon the title search conducted by Robert E. Froerer, defendants 
ATGF issued a policy of title insurance to plaintiffs 
Breuer-Harrison on or about November 14, 19 80. 
I hold that the policy of title insurance insures 
against loss or damage, costs, attorneys1 fees, and expenses, 
which the company may become obligated to pay, sustained or 
incurred, by the insured, by reason of any defect in, or lien, or 
encumbrance upon such title. 
o >-; a 
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The insureds are Breuer-Harrison, Inc., the holders of 
the equitable estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated January 9, 1980, executed by Keith B. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe, his wife, as seller, and Casper J. Breuer and William M. 
Harrison, as buyers. 
I hold that the rescission of the contract between 
Breuer-Harrison and Combe, while an election of remedies between 
Breuer-Earrison and Combe is not an election of remedy, insofar 
as the insurer is concerned. Rescission does not necessarily 
stop loss and damage by reason of the defect in the title, 
insofar as the insurance is concerned. Insurance is an indemnity 
policy, and is not rescinded because the underlying contract is 
rescinded. 
Combe is not a named insured and is not covered by the 
policy. While the policy is generated by the contract of sale, 
the policy is for the benefit and protection of the buyers. The 
policy does not guarantee sellers1 performance, nor does it 
insure seller. Froerer prepared the paperwork; he did not handle 
the closing. There was no preliminary title report in question, 
and no indication that Combe relied upon any preliminary title 
certificate and/or search prior to closing. 
o o n 
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Combe's motion for summary judgment against Attorneys1 
Title Guaranty Fund and Robert Froerer is denied. ATGF and 
Froerer's motion against Combe is granted. The dispute between 
Breuer-Harrison and Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund is reserved 
for trial. 
DATED this ^ T day of May, 19 87. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^h day of May, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions for 
Summary Judgment was served upon the following: 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
Attorney for Breuer-Harrison 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Theodore E. Kanell 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant Froerer 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Erik Stindberg 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDAHLER 
Attorney for Defendants Combe 
424 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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David E. West 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WES'i 
Attorney for Defendant ATGF 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. R. Chambers 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorney for First Security Bank 
1020 First Security Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84401 
^VL>vA . 
PAULA CARR, S e c r e t a r y 
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Tab J 
David E. West 3427 
Armstrong, Rawlings & West 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 359-2093 
/-St 
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WEBER c V u V S CLERK 
RICHARD*. GREECE 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., 




KEITH P. COMBE AND EVELYN 
COMBE, ROBERT E. FROERER 
AND ATTORNEYS1 TITLE 
GUARANTY FUND, INC., and 




Civil No. 90135 
The parties herein having filed various motions for 
summary judgment against each other and all pending motions 
for summary judgment having come on for oral argument on the 6 
day of May, 1987, and the plaintiffs being represented at said 
hearing by their attorney, Jack L. Schoenhals; and defendants 
Combe being represented at said hearing by their attorney, 
John P. Ashton; and defendant Robert E. Froerer being repre-
sented at said hearing by his attorney, Theodore E. Kanell; 
and defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. being 
i o 
represented at said hearing by its attorney David E. West, and 
the parties having filed memorandums of authority in support 
of their respective positions, and the Court having taken said 
motions under advisement and having then issued its written 
ruling setting forth its reasons and conclusions for the with-
in summary judgment, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant Combes1 Motion for Summary Judgment against 
defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and Robert E. 
Froerer is denied. 
2. Defendant Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund!s Motion for 
Summary Judgment against defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe is granted. 
3. Defendant Robert E. Froerer1s Motion for Summary 
Judgment against defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe is 
granted. 
4. The dispute between plaintiffs and defendant Attor-
neys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. is reserved for trial. 
EY THE COURT this _r__ day of June, 1987. 
V^  RONALD O.'HYDE ' 
DISTRICT JUDGE . 
- 2 -
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 9 day of June, 1987, I mail-
a copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment to the following: 
Mr. Jack L. Schoenhals 
36 South State Street 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Erik Strindberg 
Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler 
City Center One, Suite 900 
175 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Bruce A. Maak 
Rooker, Larsen Kimball & Parr 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Theodore E. Kanell 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mr. Jim Davis 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
2404 Washington Boulevard, #1020 
Ogden Utah 84401 
TabK 









RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
Case No. 90135 
Date: 9-21-87 
Vicki Godfrey, Reporter 
S. Taylor, Court Clerk 
This is the time set for PreTrial and Motions. 
Plaintiff was represented by Jack Schoenhals, Esq. 
Defendant Combe, was present and represented by John 
Ashton, Esq. 
Defendant Title Guarantee, was represented by David E. 
West, Esq. 
Defendant Robert Froerer, was represented by Ted Kanell, 
Esq. 
Issues and motions presented to the Court by plaintiff's 
counsel: 
Scope of trial presented by plaintiff's counsel to the 
Court. 
1. equity issue presented to the Court. 
2. rescission (paid FMV rental amount) issue presented 
to the Court. 
3. issue as to insurance. 
4. issue as to property back interest. 
Response by Mr. West. 
Response by Mr. Kanell. 




Both counsel concur with plaintiff's counsel on the 
issues of trial and no jury needed. 
Response by Mr. Ashton. 
Statement by Mr. Schoenhals. 
Statement by Mr. West. 
Statement by Mr. Kanell. 
Statement by the Court to counsel, Court finds this to 
be two 2 cases. 
Court to hear the issue of, what if any monies to be 
given back (rescission action). All other matters separate 
issues to be heard at a later time. 
Statement by all counsel. 
Court ordered the trial to go forward, September 22, 
1987 at 10:30 a.m., a jury will be called. 
TabL 
Jack L. Schoenhals (#2881) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER : ORDER 
J. BREUER AND WILLIAM M. : 
HARRISON, : , 
Plaintiffs, : '') ' 
vs. : 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, : CIVIL NO. 090135 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS : 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND : 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., : 
TRUSTEE, 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 




CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM 
M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court, in his Courtroom, on January 22, 1988, 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., pursuant to the Defendants Combes1 
Motion for a New Trial, the Plaintiffs were represented by 
Jack L. Schoenhals, the Defendants Keith Combe and Evelyn 
Combe were represented by John Ashton, the Defendant Clair 
Combe was represented by Bernard L. Allen, the Defendant 
Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund was represented by David West, 
Jr., the Defendant Robert E. Froerer was represented by 
Hansen, Epperson, & Smith, the Court having reviewed the 
files and records in this matter and having heard argument of 
counsel, now therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants Combes1 Motion 
for a New Trial be, and the same is hereby denied. 




I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Order to the following, this 2 d aY of ^ Eabsia-ry, 1988. 
Erik Strindberg, Esq. 
City Center One, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce A. Maak, Esq. 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Z. Davis, Esq. 
79 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Bernard L. Allen 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Theodore E. Kannell, Esq. 
650 Clark Learning Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David E. West, Esq. 
1300 Walker Building 






Jack L. Schoenhals (£2881) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2344 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 




KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE, 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for 
CLAIR C. COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, 090135 
Civil No. 90793 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, on the limited 
1 
issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and First 
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair C. 
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid 
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C. 
Combe (substituted party for First Security Bank), to the 
Plaintiffs, the Court having determined that the issues 
regarding the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E. 
Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have 
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said 
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to 
observe the proceedings, but not being permitted to 
participate in the proceedings, the Plaintiff William 
Harrison being present and having been sworn and having 
given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals, 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been 
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and 
being represented by John Ashton and Erik Strindberg; the 
interests of Clair C. Combe being represented by counsel for 
Keith P, Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called 
additional witnesses who were sworn and having introduced 
testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the 
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe 
2 
and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter 
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and 
the Court having granted the Plaintiffs1 Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs, Casper J. Breuer and William M. 
Harrison as buyers; and Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and 
First Security Bank, N.A., Trustee, as sellers, entered into 
a Real Estate Contract dated December 29, 1979. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Contract, 
the buyers (Plaintiffs) paid the sum of $75,000.00 as a down 
payment. 
3. The buyers and the sellers entered into four 
amendments to the real estate contract which altered the 
terms and conditions of the payments due under the terms of 
the real estate contract, but in all other respects, the Real 
Estate Contract remained in full force and effect. 
4. The Real Estate Contract required the sellers to 
execute and deliver to the buyers or assigns, good and 
sufficient warranty deeds covering title to the property. 
5. The sellers were unable to convey by good and 
sufficient warranty deeds unencumbered title to the real 
3 
property described in the Real Estate Contract. In this 
regard there is a 30 foot wide easement which traverses the 
property diagonally in a northwest direction and within that 
easement is an irrigation aqueduct of substantial size. 
6. The easement and aqueduct are neither described in 
the Real Estate Contract nor are they excepted from the 
obligations of the sellers to convey good and sufficient 
warranty deeds free and clear of liens and encumbrances. 
7. The Court previously determined that the sellers 
could not convey by good and sufficient warranty deeds 
unencumbered title to the real property described in the Real 
Estate Contract and could not comply with paragraph 8 of the 
Real Estate Contract and could not convey title to the real 
property free and clear of the easement and aqueduct. 
8. The Court previously determined that the easement 
and aqueduct were not a minor inconvenience, but instead 
constituted a substantial encumbrance to the fee title to the 
property. 
9. The Court previously determined that the buyers were 
relieved of any further obligation to perform under the terms 
of the Real Estate Contract. 
10. The Plaintiffs made the payments required under the 
terms of the Real Estate Contract for the years 1980, 1981, 
4 
1982, and 1983. 
11. In the year 1983, the Defendant Keith P. Combe 
desired to borrow money against the balance due on the Real 
Estate Contract, and came to the Plaintiffs for permission to 
borrow against the equity of the Combes, and in the process, 
provided a Title Report to the Plaintiffs which showed that 
there was an easement which ran diagonally across the 
property. The Plaintiffs made inquiry and investigation into 
the status of the property and confirmed the existence of the 
easement. 
12. The Plaintiffs asked their engineering firms to 
investigate the impact of the easement and to determine 
whether or not the easement would prohibit or substantially 
interfere with the development of the property. 
13. For the next several months thereafter, the 
Plaintiffs investigated various alternative ways to overcome 
the effect of the easement and to see if it was possible for 
them to retain the property and develop the property 
profitably, notwithstanding the existence of the easement. 
14. The Plaintiffs made a substantial effort, over a 
substantial period of time, to see if they could mitigate 
their damages and/or mitigate the impact of the easement and 
the aqueduct upon the property, and in this regard, they 
5 
hired the services of engineers and examined alternative 
methods of developing the property around the easement and 
aqueduct, but concluded that it was not possible to develop 
the property profitably given the purchase price, the cost of 
engineering and expenses necessary to overcome the easement 
and the aqueduct and the loss of market value of the lots as 
a result of the existence of the easement and the burdens 
associated with the easement. 
15. The easement was subject to several burdens and 
requirements which included the following: 
a. The necessity of placing some form of 
concrete bridging or strain relief over the 
aqueduct before a road could be constructed over 
the aqueduct, the cost of which made the placement 
of a road over the aqueduct too expensive to 
reasonably consider for development purposes, 
b. The right of access remaining in the 
conservancy district to repair or replace the line. 
c. The obligation of the cost of the 
restoration of the surface, after replacement or 
repair, being placed upon the owner of fee title to 
the land. 
16. The Plaintiffs met with the Combes for the purpose 
6 
of attempting to resolve their differences to see if the 
Combes would reduce the purchase price so that they could 
make the development of the property a profitable venture, 
but the Defendant Keith P. Combe advised the Plaintiffs that 
he would not be willing to reduce the purchase price, 
17. On October 1, 1984, the Plaintiffs filed this 
action seeking alternative remedies against the Combes and 
other parties. 
18. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in which they requested a rescission of the 
Real Estate Contract. 
19. The Court awarded the Plaintiffs a Summary Judgment 
and determined that the Defendants were unable to convey 
title as promised in the Real Estate Contract and the Court 
determined that Plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the 
Contract, have an Order of Rescission entered, and were 
entitled to a refund. 
20. The Court directed the parties to attempt to 
resolve, between themselves, the amount of the refund to be 
paid, and if they could not resolve the matter to come back 
to the Court for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the 
refund to be paid to the Plaintiffs. 
21. The parties could not resolve the matter between 
7 
themselves and the case was set for trial. 
22. The Plaintiffs were unable to locate one or more 
cancelled checks demonstrating payments of principal and 
interest to the Combes and First Security Bank, as trustee 
for Clair C Combe, and although the Plaintiffs claimed that 
they had made total contract payments in the sum of 
$217,575.25, the Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a 
Stipulation that the Defendants would stipulate and agree and 
the Plaintiffs were willing to stipulate and agree that they 
had paid the total sum of $216,069.69 in payments of 
principal and interest and the additional sum of $15,13 3.00 
for real estate taxes for a total agreed upon payment by the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants of principal, interest and taxes 
in the sum of $231,202.00. 
23. The accrued interest on the payments from the date 
the payments were made to and including December 1, 1987, is 
in the sum of $132,595.72, and the accrued interest on the 
payments made on the taxes is in the sum of $596.92 for a 
total of $133,192.64 prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% 
per annum from the date of the payments to and including May 
14, 1981 and at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of 
the payments to and including December 1, 1987, and the 
additional interest to March 1, 1988 is in the sum of 
8 
$5,764.21, for a total judgment, together with interest in 
the sum of $370,158.85. 
24. Fair rental value or fair market rental means the 
amount for which the property in question could be leased in 
the market with a willing lessor and a willing lessee dealing 
at arms1 length, neither being compelled to lease the 
property, and is the equivalent of the amount for which a 
willing lessor and a willing lessee would be willing to lease 
the property in its present condition. 
25. The fair market rental of the property is dependent 
upon the market place and a rental figure which is in excess 
of that which a willing lessee would be willing to pay for 
the lease of the property is excessive and does not represent 
the true fair market rental value. 
26. The property which is the subject matter of this 
action has been utilized for many years for the purpose of 
growing alfalfa. 
27. There is a market in the Weber County area for 
rental of unimproved property for alfalfa fields, and other 
agricultural purposes. 
28. The highest and best use for the property which is 
the subject of this action, in its present state, is for 
agricultural purposes for either alfalfa, melons, Christmas 
9 
trees, or other such similar agricultural use and the sum of 
$75.00 per acre times 20 acres or a total sum of $1,500.00 
per year is the reasonable fair market rental value of the 
property which should be credited to the Combes as a 
deduction from the refund to be paid by the Combes to the 
Plaintiffs. 
29. The ultimate highest and best use for the real 
property is for residential development, but in order to 
achieve the highest and best use, substantial time, money and 
effort must be expended to achieve the highest and best use. 
30. The highest and best use of the property 
(residential development) requires that it be platted, the 
appropriate governmental agency approve the plat and the 
property be developed with the addition of water, sewer and 
utilities, curb, gutter and roadway. 
31. For the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and in to 1983, 
there was a substantial dispute among the various 
governmental entities as to which entity would provide sewer 
services to the property in question. 
32. Shortly after the Plaintiffs entered into the Real 
Estate Contract to purchase the land they proceeded forward 
to attempt to get the property platted, the plat approved and 
sewer and water available for development of the property. 
10 
33. As a result of the dispute between various 
governmental entities . as to the sewer connection, the 
Plaintiffs did not develop the property for a period of time. 
34. Whether or not the property could be developed 
economically without attachment to a community sewer system 
and whether or not the moratorium issued by the governmental 
authorities prohibited development of the property were 
questions which substantially impacted upon the economic 
feasibility of developing the property during the first few 
years after Plaintiffs had entered into the Real Estate 
Contract with Defendants and delayed the development of the 
property. 
35. The Plaintiffs proceeded forward to attempt to 
develop the property through the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, 
and in the process of attempting to develop the property, had 
hired the services of Great Basin Engineering to perform 
percolation tests, to prepare a plat for the property, and to 
assist the Plaintiffs in obtaining subdivision approval from 
the government authorities. In addition, the Plaintiffs had 
worked with the governmental authorities in an attempt to 
resolve the dispute between the governmental entities as to 
which entity would provide the sewer services to the 
property. 
11 
36. The property has subsequently been annexed as a 
result of the efforts of the Plaintiffs, and sewer connection 
is now available and because of the present condition of the 
property and the zoning and the community services available, 
the property can now be developed for residential use. 
37. When the Plaintiffs discovered that the easement 
ran diagonally across the property, consisted of a 30! 
easement and had other attendant difficulties attached to the 
easement, they expended a substantial quantity of time and 
money in an effort to see if they could overcome the effect 
of the easement and to develop the property economically. 
38. During the summer of 1984, the Plaintiffs concluded 
that they would be unable to develop the property in a 
profitable manner, given the extent and nature of the 
easement and the cost to overcome the difficulties posed by 
the easement and those which might be posed by the easement 
in the event the restrictions and conditions regarding the 
easement were enforced rigidly, and the Plaintiffs went to 
the Combes to ask the Combes to make a concession in the 
purchase price so that they could proceed forward to develop 
the property in a profitable manner. 
39. Keith Combe refused to grant a price concession and 
the Plaintiffs filed legal action. 
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40. The Defendants1 expert witness and appraiser, 
William Christensen, did not give testimony as to the fair 
market rental value of the property, but instead, gave 
testimony of the fair rate of return that might be expected 
from the profitable development of real estate based upon an 
assumption of an expected annual rate of return on the 
investment at the rate of approximately 10% per year or an 
annual expected rate of return in the amount of $49,350.00 
per year; and then testified that the expected annual rate of 
return on the investment at a fixed percentage of return 
would be equated to fair market rental. The appraiser 
testified, however, that the definition of fair market value 
was the most probable sale price that would occur when two 
people were to negotiate at arms1 length with neither being 
compelled to sell or to purchase, and that if there were no 
buyer at the asking price, that the law of supply and demand 
would cause the price to be dropped until it reached the 
level of demand. 
41. Since no potential lessee could be reasonably 
expected to pay $4 9,3 50.00 a year for the rental of the 
property, the expected rate of return did not equate to the 
fair market rental of the property and could not be utilized 
for the purpose of determining the fair market rental of the 
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property. 
42. The Defendants offered no other testimony 
concerning the fair market rental of the property other than 
the testimony of William Christensen as to the fair rate of 
return that a person might expect on an investment, and which 
rate of return was not the equivalent of the fair market 
rental of the property. 
43. The issue of the amount of the payments made by the 
Plaintiffs to the Defendants was resolved by stipulation 
between the parties. 
44. The only remaining issue to be determined was the 
fair market rental value of the property. 
45. The matter before the court was and is an issue of 
equitable restitution and the Defendants are not entitled to 
a jury trial on the equitable issues. 
46. The matter was not one which should have been 
submitted to a jury for the following reasons: 
a. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants had 
stipulated as to the amounts which had been paid by 
the Plaintiffs to the Defendants for principal and 
interest and had stipulated as to the amounts which 
the Plaintiffs had paid for taxes and there was no 
issue to be resolved concerning the payments made 
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by the Plaintiffs. 
b. The amount of interest to be credited to 
the Plaintiffs was not contested by the Defendants. 
c. There was only one remaining issue to be 
resolved, and that was the fair market rental value 
of the property. 
d. There was no evidence or testimony offered 
by the Defendants of the fair market rental value 
of the property. 
e. The only evidence of the fair market 
rental value of the property was offered by the 
Plaintiffs and that value did not exceed the sum of 
$1,500.00 per year. 
f. The case involved issues of equity and the 
jury opinion would have been advisory only. 
g. There was nothing left to submit to the 
jury since there was no evidence of fair market 
rental other than that submitted by the Plaintiffs. 
47. The Court determined that the matter should not be 
submitted to the jury for an advisory opinion and the Court 
determined that it should rule on the facts and the law and 
should grant the Plaintiffs1 Motion for a Directed Verdict 
and/or for a Judgment. 
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48. The Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict 
and/or a judgment to be entered in their behalf in the amount 
Plaintiffs had paid to Defendants and had paid for taxes on 
the real property, and for the interest which had accrued 
thereon from the date of the payments, and the Defendants 
were entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of 
the property, together with interest thereon, which the Court 
determined did not exceed the sum of $1,500.00 a year. 
49. The Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe 
received 74.6% of the payments and the benefit thereon, and 
the Defendant First Security Bank as trustee for Clair C, 
Combe received 25.4% of the payments and the benefit thereon. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, 
now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is a case in equity and the only issues being 
tried are those of equitable restitution upon a judgment of 
rescission. 
2. The Defendants are not entitled to a jury. The 
Court accommodated the Defendants1 request for a jury with 
the anticipation that the jury would render an advisory 
opinion. 
3. The combination of: the issue of the amount of the 
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payments made by Plaintiffs to Defendants having been 
resolved by stipulation between the parties; and the amount 
of the interest due on the payments being uncontested by the 
Defendants; and the failure of the Defendants to provide 
competent evidence to demonstrate that the fair market rental 
of the property exceeded the sum of $1,500.00 per year; 
constituted sufficient cause and justification for the Court 
to determine and conclude that there was nothing left to 
submit to the jury and that it would be improper to submit 
the matter to the jury. 
4. The Court was justified in dismissing the jury and 
in granting a directed verdict, and/or Judgment for the 
Plaintiffs for the sums of money paid by the Plaintiffs and 
as stipulated by the parties and in awarding to the 
defendants a credit in an amount equal to the maximum amount 
demonstrated to be the fair rental value of the property. 
5. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment 
determining that they paid to the Defendants the total sum of 
$216,069.69 in payments on principal and interest and the 
additional sum of $15,133.00 for real estate taxes for a 
total agreed upon payment by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants 
for principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $231,202.00. 
6. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment awarding 
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them prejudgment interest from the date of the payment of the 
principal, interest and taxes in the sum of $133,192.64, 
together with the additional sum of $5,764.21 representing 
the interest to March 1, 1988. 
7. The Defendants are entitled to a credit against the 
judgment for the reasonable rental of the property for the 
years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per year for a total sum of $7,500.00 credit with 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, to and 
including the 22nd day of September, 1987, in the sum of 
$3,562.50 and from September 22, 1987 to March 1, 1988 in the 
sum of $330.82, for a total credit of $11,392.82. 
8. The Defendants introduced no credible or competent 
evidence or testimony to demonstrate that the fair market 
rental of the property would have exceeded the sum of 
$1,500,00 per year<> 
9. The Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest 
at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date each payment 
was made by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants. 
10. In an equitable case of rescission, the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a refund of the payments they have made, 
including both principal and interest, and payments of real 
property taxes and the Defendants are entitled to a credit 
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for the fair market rental value of the property during the 
time that the Plaintiffs had possession or control over the 
property. 
11. The expected rate of return on an investment is not 
equivalent to the fair market rental value of property in 
question. 
12. The highest and best use of the property in 
question in its present condition was for agricultural 
purposes. 
13. The ultimate highest and best use of the property 
was for residential development purposes, but Defendants were 
not entitled to a credit for the fair market rental value of 
the property in its final development stage since that 
contemplated the expenditure of substantial sums of money to 
develop the property, the obtaining of governmental approval 
and the uncertainties of the profitability of such a venture. 
14. The issue of either the Plaintiffs1 knowledge of 
the easement or the Defendants1 knowledge of the easement, is 
not relevant in an action for equitable restitution where the 
Court has rescinded the Contract for the reason that the 
sellers are unable to convey the title the sellers contracted 
to convey in the Real Estate Contract. 
15. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have judgment 
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entered in their behalf and against the Defendants Combes for 
the sums found, less the credit for the fair market rental 
value of the property, together with interest and costs. 
16. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a vendee's lien upon 
the property until the judgment awarded the Plaintiffs has 
been paid in full. 
Dated this / h day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ U^_ „,-JC- U 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JU0GE 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BREUER-HARRISON, INC., CASPER 




KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE, 
ROBERT E. FROERER, ATTORNEYS 
TITLE GUARANTY FUNDING, AND 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
TRUSTEE; 
KEITH P. COMBE, EVELYN COMBE 
AND FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., 
OGDEN, UTAH, as Trustee for 
CLAIR C. COMBE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
CASPER J. BREUER AND WILLIAM 
M. HARRISON, 
Defendants. 
SECOND REVISED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 090135 
U-. 7 
Civil No. 90793 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing on September 22, 1987, at 9:30 a.m., before the 





issues of the total amount of payments made by Plaintiffs to 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe and First 
Security Bank, N.A., Ogden Utah, as Trustee for Clair c. 
Combe, and the amount of restitution and/or refund to be paid 
by the Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and Clair C. 
Combe (substituted party for First Security Bank), to the 
Plaintiffs, the Court having determined that the issues 
regarding the claims of the Plaintiffs against Robert E. 
Froerer and the Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund were to have 
been severed and tried at a subsequent date, and the said 
parties not being present, but their counsel being present to 
observe the proceedings, but not being permitted to 
participate in the proceedings, the Plaintiff William 
Harrison being present and having been sworn and having 
given testimony, and being represented by Jack L. Schoenhals, 
the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe having been 
present and having been sworn and having given testimony, and 
being represented by John Ashton- and Erik Strindberg; the 
interests of Claim c. Combe being represented by counsel for 
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe; the parties having called 
additional witnesses who were sworn and having introduced 
testimony and evidence, and the Court having received the 
same, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Keith P. Combe 
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and Evelyn Combe having rested their case, and the matter 
having been fully argued and presented before the Court, and 
the Court having granted the Plaintiffs1 Motion for a 
Directed Verdict and for a Judgment, the Court having made 
and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, now 
therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a 
judgment against the Defendants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe, calculated as follows: the sum of $231,202,00, 
together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $133,192.64 
and $5,764.21, for a total sum of $370,158.85 x 74.6%, for a 
total judgment against Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe, 
jointly and severally, in the sum of $276,138.50, and the 
Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a judgment 
against the Defendant Clair C. Combe, calculated as follows: 
the sum of $231,202.00, together with pre-judgment interest 
in the sum of $133,192.64 and $5,764.21, for a total sum of 
$370,158.85 x 25.4%, for a total judgment against Clair C. 
Combe in the sum of $94,020.35, together with interest 
thereon against the said Defendants at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date hereof until paid. 
2. The Defendants Keith P. Combe, Evelyn Combe, and 
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Clair C. Combe, be, and the same are hereby awarded a credit 
against the aforesaid Judgment in the sum of $11,392.82, 
which credit represents the fair market rental value of the 
property during the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984, 
3. The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded a 
vendee's lien on the property which is the subject matter of 
this action and which is described as follows, which lien 
shall remain upon and against the following described 
property until the aforesaid judgment, together with interest 
and costs is paid in full. The real property is described as 
follows: 
PARCEL 1; 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 238 feet, 
thence North 9 00 feet, more or less, to the center 
of Combe Road, thence Northwesterly along said 
centerline to a point North of beginning, thence 
South 930 feet, more or less, to the place of 
beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: 
Beginning at a point 763 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Running 
thence East 174.36 feet; thence North 625 feet, 
more or less, to the centerline of Combe Road,; 
thence Northwesterly along said centerline to a 
point North of beginning; thence South 750 feet, 
more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Containing 2,75 acres. 
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PARCEL 3 : 
Beginning at a point 937.36 feet East of the 
Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; 
running thence East 60.73 feet; thence 
Northeasterly to a point on the center of Combe 
Road, said point being East 197.88 feet and North 
0004l30,t West 571.02 feet to the centerline of 
Combe Road and Northwesterly along said centerline 
15 feet; thence Northwesterly along centerline of 
said road to a point North of beginning; thence 
South 625 feet to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running 
thence East 250 feet, thence North 835 feet, more 
or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
Northwesterly along said centerline to a point 
North of beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or 
less, to the place of beginning. Containing 5 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: 
Beginning 488 feet East of the Southwest corner of 
the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 275 
feet, thence North 750 feet, more or less, to the 
center of the County Road, thence Northwesterly 
along the center of said County Road to a point 
North 835 feet, more or less, from the point of 
beginning, thence South 835 feet, more or less, to 
the point of beginning. Containing 3.40 acres. 
4. The Plaintiffs be and the same are hereby awarded 
their costs of Court. 
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Dated this / £ day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: r 
-/^V/ 
s 
RONALD (5. HYDE, JUDQE 
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